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ARTICLES
AQUINAS’S PROHIBITION OF KILLING
RECONSIDERED
JOHN MAKDISI†
INTRODUCTION
St. Thomas Aquinas speaks to the heart of what it means to
be human in our relationship with God when he expounds the
way of the moral life in his Summa Theologiae.1 A classic
example of the depth of his understanding is evident in his
treatment of acts that knowingly kill. His style of writing is
succinct and sometimes his ideas are distributed among several
texts, but one can mine the riches of his thought with patient
reading and reflection. This Article focuses exclusively on the
extreme case where a person is certain to die if nothing is done
and the only way to save that person is by one’s act while
knowing that it must result in the certain killing of another
person. Most scholars using some version of the doctrine of
double effect interpret Aquinas to permit such an act when it
repulses the attack of an aggressor on someone’s life. This
Article rejects this conclusion as well as its justification in the
doctrine of double effect and proposes a rule that more accurately
reflects the texts of Aquinas as he distinguishes prohibited acts
from permitted acts. Specifically, it argues that his rule is that,
when a person (whether oneself or another) is certain to die if
nothing is done and the only way to save that person is by one’s
act (as a private individual and not one acting under public
authority) knowing that it must result in the certain killing of
some other person (whether or not an aggressor), the act is
prohibited unless one retains or removes a vital life support from
the person killed2 that belongs to the person saved (whether
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1
See generally ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (1st ed. Benziger
Brothers 1947) (1266–1273) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
2
A vital life support consists of such things as food and water to sustain the
body against hunger and thirst, air to sustain the body against suffocation, material
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oneself or another), or unless one ducks, blocks or redirects a
deadly force away from the person saved (whether oneself or
another who is under one’s charge). If the act does not fit within
one of the two exceptions, then it is an attack on the vital life
support of the person killed and is a prohibited killing. The first
Part explains how and why Aquinas constructs this prohibitory
rule and its exceptions. The second Part adds further clarity by
applying the rule to several controversial modern-day cases.
I.

THE DEFINITION OF A PROHIBITED KILLING

Among the texts of Aquinas there are six key statements
which expound the core of his doctrine on killing. Three of them
prohibit killing. Aquinas states that “it is altogether unlawful to
kill oneself,”3 “it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent,”4 and “it
is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense,
except for such as have public authority.”5 Three of them provide
a counter. Despite the unlawfulness of killing oneself, Aquinas
states that “[i]t is clear that the sign of the greatest love is to lay
down one’s life for one’s friends.”6 Despite the unlawfulness of
killing the innocent, he states that
if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and
had merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or
others under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and
that of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then
necessary to him.7

Finally, despite the unlawfulness of intentionally killing a man
in self-defense, he states that “it [is not] necessary for salvation
that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid
killing the other man.”8 This Part uses these six statements to

support to sustain the body against a fall or drowning, and even one’s own body
itself.
3
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 1469.
4
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470.
5
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
6
THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN, Chapters 9–21
(The Aquinas Institute ed., Fabian Larcher trans.), in 36 BIBLICAL COMMENTARIES
290 (C. 15, L. 2) (2013), commenting on John 15:13: “Greater love than this no man
has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
7
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329.
8
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
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develop an understanding of Aquinas’s prohibition against killing
by one acting as a private individual9 even though that one
knows it is the only way to save oneself or another person.
A.

Prohibition

Aquinas’s prohibition against killing by a private individual
is based on our understanding that God retains authority over
the life and death of a human person: “[L]ife is God’s gift to man,
and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. . . . For
it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life,
according to Deut. 32:39, I will kill and I will make to live.”10
God gives mankind the power of life and death over plants and
animals,11 but He does not give mankind dominion over death:
“Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore
he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which
pertain to this life which is ruled by man’s free-will,” says
Aquinas, “[b]ut the passage from this life to another and happier
one is subject not to man’s free-will but to the power of God.”12

9

This Article does not examine acts by an individual acting under public
authority. Aquinas permits killing for the common good by a person acting under
public authority because “the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of
rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can
lawfully put evildoers to death.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, at 1467. For example, a
judge acts on the authority of the community when he sentences a man to death. Id.
pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, ad. 3, at 1470. Aquinas states in his COMMENTARY ON THE
GOSPEL OF MATTHEW, CHAPTERS 1–12 (Jeremy Holmes and Beth Mortensen trans.),
in 33 BIBLICAL COMMENTARIES 161 (C. 5, L. 7.483) (2013), that “it is permitted to
those who kill by the command of God, for God is the one who does it. But every law
is a command from God: by me kings reign (Prov 8:15); he does not bear the sword in
vain for his is God’s minister (Rom 13:4).” Therefore, it is permitted for secular
judges to sentence people according to the laws (“iudices seculares qui condemnant
secundum leges”) but not for one to kill on one’s own authority (“auctoritate
propria”). The reason for permitting those with public authority to kill and
prohibiting those with no such authority may reside in the parable of the wheat and
the tares in Matthew 13:24–30. Aquinas uses this parable to show that the Lord
justifies the killing of sinners, but not if they cannot be distinguished from the
innocent. Aquinas states that “Our Lord commanded them to forbear from
uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. . . . [W]hen the wicked
cannot be slain without the good being killed with them,” but when “the good incur
no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the
latter may be lawfully put to death.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q.
64, art. 2, ad. 1, at 1467. The rule that only those with public authority can kill the
sinner minimizes the chances that an innocent person will be killed by requiring an
official determination before someone is determined to be a sinner.
10
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 1469.
11
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 1 & ad. 1, at 1466.
12
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469.
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The reason that God retains authority over the life and
death of human persons is that they are “made to God’s image, in
so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with
free-will and self-movement,”13 which enables them to become
sons of God through the work of the Holy Spirit.14 Aquinas states
that “filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner,
since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but
by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer
we approach to the true idea of filiation.”15 Human persons as
rational creatures have a more perfect likeness to God than
irrational creatures because they have “the likeness of His
image,” whereas irrational creatures have filiation “by reason
only of a trace.”16 The difference is crucial because “[t]he likeness
by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life,
whereas the likeness of image does.”17 Aquinas states that “the
life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for
man,”18 and therefore “it is lawful both to take life from plants for
the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men.”19 The
rational creature, on the other hand, is “competent, properly
speaking, to possess good” and thus capable of the fellowship of
friendship in charity which can attain everlasting happiness.20
13
Id. pt. I-II, prologue, at 583 (quoting JOHN DAMASCENE, DE FIDE ORTHODOXA
2.12). The Catholic Church confirms that “[e]very human life, from the moment of
conception until death, is sacred because the human person has been willed for its
own sake in the image and likeness of the living and holy God.” CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2319 (2d ed., 1997).
14
Aquinas states that “in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which
man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed
by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in
addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. viii. 14, 17:
Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs
also.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 68, art. 2, at 879.
15
Id. pt. I, Q. 33, art. 3, at 175.
16
Id.
17
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1282.
18
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 1, ad. 1, at 1460.
19
Id. Aquinas explains that “[d]umb animals and plants are devoid of the life of
reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another,
by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and
accommodated to the uses of others.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 1, ad. 2, at 1460. “Man
owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself,
indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 103, art. 4,
ad. 3, at 1634.
20
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 3, at 1282. See also John Haldane & Patrick Lee,
Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life, 78 PHIL. 255, 276–
78 (2003) (showing that Pope John Paul II and Aquinas are of one mind on the
sacred reality of human life).
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Therefore, “it is unlawful to kill any man [nullum occidere licet],
since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the
nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying
him.”21
The prohibition against killing applies to killing any person.
Charitable love of one’s neighbor is love of all mankind, including
sinners and enemies.22 Neighbor means one who is “nigh to us,”
namely, “as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity
for glory,” and one “should love his neighbor for God’s sake, even
as he loves himself for God’s sake, so that his love for his
neighbor is a holy love.”23 Humankind constitutes the body of the
Church with Christ as the head and the Holy Spirit as the
heart,24 and no person may destroy any part of this body because
no person has a nature distinct from any other person.25 In the
Sermon on the Mount, Christ elaborated on the nature of
charitable love, the love that undergirds the commandment not
to kill: Not only should one not kill, but one should not have
animosity towards another,26 one should answer an injustice with
kindness and not with retaliation,27 and one should love one’s
enemies and pray for those who persecute one.28 The virtue of
charitable love lies in loving God so much that, as Aquinas
explains, one loves all that is connected with Him, including one’s
enemies.29 This virtue must certainly have been what Aquinas

21
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. It is true
that an individual man may be considered in relation to the community and
therefore, “the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good,
which is corrupted by sin.” Id. However, “the care of the common good is entrusted to
persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private
individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, at 1467.
22
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 11, art. 4, at 1227.
23
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 44, art. 7, at 1378.
24
Id. pt. III, Q. 8, art. 1, at 2076; pt. III, Q. 8, art. 3, at 2077; and pt. III, Q. 8,
art. 1, ad. 3, at 2076.
25
See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1468 (“[A] man who has sinned is not by
nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to
condemn him to death for the common good.”).
26
Matthew 5:21–24 (New American).
27
Id. 5:38–42.
28
Id. 5:43–45.
29
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 23, art. 1, ad. 2, at 1269–70
(“Friendship extends . . . to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has
friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they
children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our
friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate
us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom
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had in mind when he stated that “it is not lawful for a man [in
his private capacity] to intend killing a man in selfdefense . . . .”30
Therefore, in accord with this interpretation of Aquinas, one
must overcome the inclination to attack the vital life support of
an aggressor who is about to take one’s life because one’s love of
God is at stake. The image of God resides in the aggressor and it
is not merely that we destroy another human being but that we
destroy God’s image within him.31 In doing so, we offend God
whom we love more than anyone else in this world including
ourselves.32 We must not destroy the nature that God has
created in His own image, even if it means our own death or the
death of our loved ones. This is difficult without the help of God,
but we can expand our vision to see others through Christ’s eyes
by accepting God’s gift of charity through which we can come to
treat all people as gifts of God under his sovereignty.33

we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly
directed.”).
30
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. Note that the sed contra in this Article
suggests that Aquinas would allow the intentional killing of a man in self-defense,
because Exodus 22:2 allows the killing of a thief who breaks into one’s house.
However, the sed contra does not represent Aquinas’s thought but merely an
argument contrary to the objections. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, sed contra, at 1471.
31
Aquinas states that “it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner,
and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out
of charity, for God’s sake.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 6, at 1290. We love our neighbor
“that he may be in God. . . . [And thus,] it is specifically the same act whereby we
love God, and whereby we love our neighbor.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 1, at 1286. The
actual love of one’s “enemy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for [one] to do
so, belongs to the perfection of charity.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 25, art. 8, at 1292.
32
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 3, at 1296 (“[T]he fellowship of natural goods bestowed
on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which . . . man, so long as
his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than
himself . . . .”).
33
Aquinas states that “charity itself surpasses our natural faculties,” and is in
us “by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and
the participation of Whom in us is created charity . . . .” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 2, at
1276. It can increase in intensity by this infusion when one strives to dispose oneself
to receiving it through acts of charity. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 6, at 1279–80. Charity
can be perfected in this life to the extent that a person “makes an earnest endeavor
to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so
far as the needs of the present life demand.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 8, at 1281. This
perfection is reached by first avoiding sin and resisting one’s concupiscences, then by
pursuing progress in the good so as to strengthen one’s charity, and then by aiming
chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God, which “belongs to the perfect who desire
to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 24, art. 9, at 1282.
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The order of charitable love described by Aquinas does not
detract from this prohibition on killing. One loves God more
than oneself because He is the greatest good to Whom one is
naturally drawn by one’s own nature and even more by “the
friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts
of grace.”34 Next, one loves oneself more than any other person
“by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves
his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good.”35 However,
this love of oneself more than neighbor does not allow one to kill
one’s neighbor to save oneself because it is in bearing bodily
injury for one’s friend’s sake that one loves oneself by sharing in
the Divine good.36 Bodily injury includes one’s own death when
one is faced with the choice of suffering death or acting
immorally by killing another. Aquinas affirms this when he says
that one should defend oneself even at the risk of another’s life,
but “it is not lawful for a man [in his private capacity] to intend
killing a man in self-defense.”37 In other words, one must not
attack the vital life support of another person if it is certain to
kill him, even when it is the only way to save oneself from an
aggressor. To kill one’s neighbor is to destroy the fellowship that
gives one a share of the Divine good and, by this destruction, to
reject the charitable love of God. We love ourselves more by
suffering death than by rejecting God’s love.
Contrary to this interpretation, a number of scholars have
maintained that Aquinas does not prohibit killing if the
alternative is one’s own death at the hands of an aggressor.38 In
recent times many of these scholars have claimed that Aquinas
permits such killing by what is now popularly known as the
doctrine of double effect. The doctrine purports to derive from
Aquinas’s statement that “the act of self-defense may have two
effects, one is the saving of one’s life [intended], the other is the
slaying of the aggressor [beside the intention]. . . . [So that] this
act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not
unlawful.”39 Joseph Boyle, who is a strong proponent of the
doctrine, maintains that what Aquinas means by “intended” in
34

Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 3, at 1297.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 4, at 1297.
36
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 4 & ad. 2, at 1297.
37
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
38
For a summary of the positions of several of these commentators, see
generally Jose Rojas, St. Thomas’ Treatise on Self-Defense Revisited, in THOMISTICA
89, 89–95 (E. Manning ed., 1995).
39
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
35
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this passage is what is sought and what he means by “beside the
intention” is what is not sought even though it is foreseen.40 So,
in an intended killing, which is prohibited, the foreseen natural
consequences are “chosen [in the sense of sought] in order to
bring about the object,”41 whereas in a killing beside the
intention, which is permissible, one seeks only to defend oneself
and not to kill one’s attacker, although one knows that one’s
attacker will be killed.42
Boyle’s definition of what is intended may be exemplified in
the case of an abused wife who kills her husband while he is
sleeping in order that he not kill her when he awakes. The death
of the husband would be sought specifically as the means to
defend herself. She acts “insuring that the assailant, being dead,
can threaten no more.”43 On the other hand, Boyle’s definition of
what is beside the intention may be exemplified in the case of an
abused wife whose husband is strangling her and the only way to
40

In other words,
[t]he doctrine of the double effect is based on a distinction between what a
man foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in the strict
sense, he intends. He intends in the strictest sense both those things that
he aims at as ends and those that he aims at as means to his ends. The
latter may be regretted in themselves but nevertheless desired for the sake
of the end . . . . By contrast a man is said not strictly, or directly, to intend
the foreseen consequences of his voluntary actions where these are neither
the end at which he is aiming nor the means to this end.
Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD
REV. 5, 5–6 (1967). These two different types of consequences have been called
instrumental and incidental respectively. Alison McIntyre, Doing Away with Double
Effect, 111 ETHICS 219, 219 (2001).
41
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas, 42 THOMIST 649, 664
(1978).
42
Id. at 660–62. This definition of intention has been adopted in some form or
other by several commentators who seek to justify killing in self-defense. See, e.g.,
GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 141–50 (3d ed., 1988); Gareth B. Matthews, Saint
Thomas and the Principle of Double Effect, in AQUINAS’S MORAL THEORY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF NORMAN KRETZMANN 64, 70, 76 (Scott MacDonald & Eleonore Stump
eds., 1999) (interpreting Aquinas as providing a “seed bed for the Principle of Double
Effect”); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of
Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 343–44 (1989) [hereinafter Quinn, Actions],
critiqued by Joseph Boyle in Who is Entitled to Double Effect?, 16 J. MED. & PHIL.
475, 483–86 (1991), to which Quinn replied in Reply to Boyle’s Who is Entitled to
Double Effect?, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 511, 511–14 (1991). It has also been questioned
by commentators who find it difficult to accept some of its conclusions. See, e.g.,
PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 21–
22 (2002), who thinks that some foreseen effects that are not sought as either an end
or a means may still be too “close” to the act to be considered unintended.
43
Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 661.

2018]

AQUINAS RECONSIDERED

75

make him stop is to shoot him in the heart. According to Boyle,
the death of the husband is not sought as the means of selfdefense. She acts “in such a way that the assailant’s death is not
what ends the threat, but is rather a consequence of what stops
the attack.”44
The moral significance of this distinction between what is
intended and what is beside the intention is that it is permissible
for a person to “direct his intention to the good effect of his action
and withhold it from the bad effect if the latter is not a means to
the former.”45 Of course, not all such acts are permissible.
Otherwise, one could kill indiscriminately in the act of achieving
a good effect so long as the killing is a side effect of the act. Boyle
provides four conditions, considered classic conditions under the
doctrine of double effect, that must be satisfied for the act to be
permissible:
(1) the agent’s end must be morally acceptable (honestus),
(2) the cause must be good or at least indifferent, (3) the good
effect must be immediate [in the sense that the bad effect is not
a means to the good effect46], and (4) there must be a grave
reason for positing the cause.47

In the example of the wife who shoots her husband as he is
strangling her, Boyle would presumably say that (1) self-defense
is a morally acceptable end, (2) the act of stopping the strangling
is good or at least indifferent, (3) the death of the husband is not
the means by which the wife defends herself but is rather a
44

Id.
Id. at 649–50.
46
Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90
ETHICS 527, 531 (1980) (Boyle’s interpretation of the third condition).
47
Id. at 528 (citing J.P. GURY, COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE MORALIS 8 (A.
Ballerini ed., Rome, Giachetti, 2d ed., 1869)). A somewhat clearer expression of these
conditions is:
(1) acceptable-end condition: the bad effect must not be intended as the end
or goal of the act; (2) acceptable-act condition: the act must not be bad in
itself (independently of its causing the bad effect); (3) acceptable-means
condition: the bad effect must not be intended as a means to the good effect;
(4) proportionate-reason condition: the agent must have a proportionately
serious moral reason for performing the act.
H.M. Giebel, Ends, Means, and Character: Recent Critiques of the Intended-VersusForeseen Distinction and the Principle of Double-Effect, 81 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 447,
447–48 (2007) (emphasis in original). For the cases examined in this Article, the first
and second conditions are presumed to exist, and the fourth condition exists because
the cases address only a life for a life. It is the third condition that causes problems
by its inadequacy. As will be shown, Aquinas’s discussion of intention in self-defense
includes what is foreseen when he states tout court that the bad effect (killing) must
not be intended.
45
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consequence of stopping the strangling, and (4) the loss of the
wife’s life that would otherwise result is a grave reason.
Therefore, the act is morally permissible. On the other hand, the
killing of the husband while he sleeps violates the third
condition.
Boyle offers support for his understanding of intention in
Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense by referring to other contexts
in which Aquinas uses the term. Boyle states that on the one
hand “there is evidence that for Aquinas the object of an act
which is chosen as a means very often becomes an end and as
such the object of an intention”48 when it is the means needed to
achieve the ultimate end.49
An example is the throwing
overboard of merchandise in order to protect the safety of the
passengers; “the choice of this means falls under the agent’s
intention” because it “is clearly a means of achieving safety.”50
On the other hand, it is possible for the consequence of a chosen
act not to be an end but rather outside the intention because it is
not needed to achieve the ultimate end. An example is the
trampling underfoot of crops in order to commit fornication; it is
an act which Aquinas says is foreseen but not intended.51 Boyle
concludes that “what is [not] ordered to the intended end . . . does
not fall within the intention,” even if it is foreseen; rather, to be
intended, the causal consequences of an act must be “part of
what the will tries to realize by the choice of the means.”52
48
Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 652–53 (citing SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 2, at 640; pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 3, at 641;
pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 4, at 682–83; pt. I-II, Q. 72, art. 3, ad. 2, at 904; pt. I-II, Q. 73, art.
3, ad. 1, at 912; pt. II-II, Q. 43, art. 3, at 1868–69; pt. II-II, Q. 110, art. 1, at 1664).
49
Id. at 653–54. Boyle states that “[the] intention bears on the end insofar as it
can be achieved by certain means.” Id. at 653. What is outside intention “lacks an
order to the end,” whereas “[t]he means necessarily involve such an order.” Id. at
654 (citing Sentences 4.4.1.1.ad2, and SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q.
102, art. 1, at 1055). Since “the end is the reason for willing the means,” the willing
of both the means and the end is one motion of the will. Id. (citing SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 4, at 641–42 and De Veritate 22.14).
50
Id. at 655–57 (referring to a case mentioned in SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK THREE: PART VI (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of
Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956)).
51
Id. at 662 (referring to a case mentioned by Aquinas in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE,
supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 915–16).
52
Id. at 664. In this 1978 article, Boyle set aside the question why “the
difference between what one intends and what one foresees but does not intend
[should] be important for the definition and moral evaluation of kinds of human
acts.” Id. at 650. However, in two later articles he answered this question. In a 1980
article he stated that the doctrine of double effect is necessary in a world of
exceptionless moral proscriptions because, when one acts to do some good, it
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Boyle is correct that the throwing overboard is a means
ordained to the end of safety while the trampling underfoot is a
consequence ordained to fornication. As Aquinas would say, the
former is an essential determination of the end and therefore
contained within the species of the end,53 whereas the latter is an
accident which accrues to the act as an addition.54 However,
Boyle insists that for Aquinas “the throwing overboard of the
merchandise is the object of an intention,”55 when in fact Aquinas
uses the term intention in a special way to refer only to “the
ultimate end which someone wills on its own account.”56 Aquinas
does the same in the case of the trampling underfoot where he
states that the trampler’s “intention is not to do this harm, but to
commit fornication.”57 This is intention simpliciter or intention
per se and does not include any reference to the means (throwing
overboard) by which the ultimate end (safety) is achieved or the
consequence of another harm (trampling underfoot). What
Aquinas is doing in the throwing overboard case is assimilating
“becomes an impossibility” not to bring about some unwanted state of affairs that is
contrary to one or more basic goods. Boyle, Toward Understanding the Principle of
Double Effect, supra note 46, at 537–38. Presumably, this is because “[w]hat one
intends and what one permits are both voluntarily brought about, and thus both are
imputable.” Id. at 530. In a 1991 article he stated that, with an absolute prohibition
against killing, “there are situations in which, whatever one chooses to do, one will
inflict the prohibited harm on someone,” and this makes for “a moral norm which
literally cannot be followed.” Boyle, Who is Entitled to Double Effect?, supra note 42,
at 486. In having made these statements, Boyle appears to characterize an omission
to act to save a person as necessarily an infliction of prohibited harm. While this
may be true for those cases in which there is a duty to save, Boyle does not appear to
recognize that for Aquinas there may be no duty to save (and therefore no infliction
of prohibited harm) if the very act of saving results in the foreseen death of another
person. Aquinas does not accept that there are situations in which a moral norm
cannot be followed. He says that “no virtue can be contrary to another virtue”
because the good of virtue “depends on fittingness in relation to some one thing—i.e.,
the reason.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 31, art. 8, ad. 1, at 727.
Therefore, as Rhonheimer affirms, “in certain circumstances, heroic sacrifices are
demanded of the human person in order to preserve purity of heart.” MARTIN
RHONHEIMER, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON: A THOMIST VIEW OF MORAL
AUTONOMY 471 (Gerald Malsbury trans., 2000). It may be difficult to do what is
good, especially when it involves losing one’s mortal life, but this is why we depend
on God’s grace to see us through.
53
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 18, art. 7, at 667–68.
54
See id. pt. I-II, Q. 18, art. 3, at 664–65.
55
Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 655.
56
Id. at 654 (quoting AQUINAS, supra note 50, at 3.6). Aquinas explains that his
use of intention here is a willing simpliciter and that the person throwing the
merchandise overboard “does not will the throwing over simpliciter but for the sake
of safety.” Id.
57
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 916.

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

78

[Vol. 57:67

the means (throwing overboard) to the evil of an inordinate act;
neither the means nor the evil is sought in the sense of desired,
so both are outside intention.58
Yet, in both the throwing overboard and the trampling
underfoot cases, when intention refers to the last end it does not
mean that what is outside intention in each of these acts is
permissible. If that were true, then all acts would be permissible
because evil itself is outside intention as Aquinas states in
discussing the throwing overboard case.59 Rather, Aquinas states
that an act derives its goodness from its last end and its suitable
object (means) and its circumstances (which add to the substance
of the object), and “an action is not good simply, unless it is good
in all those ways.”60 Since goodness is an object of the will, it is
the voluntariness of the act and not the intention of the end that
gives the act its goodness. So the means, which is outside the
intention of the end albeit good only as referred to the end,61 can
be evil and thus make an act evil. In both the throwing
overboard case and the trampling underfoot case, the agent is
responsible for the evil of what is not the end—the means in the
former and the circumstances in the latter. In the throwing
overboard case, Aquinas states that when “a person wills to do a
disorderly action for the sake of some sensory good to be
attained, . . . . [E]vil consequences and sins are called
voluntary.”62 In the trampling underfoot case, he states that “the

58

Boyle, Praeter Intentionem, supra note 41, at 654 (quoting AQUINAS, supra
note 50, at 3.6). See also THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL 1.3, at 70 (Richard Regan
trans., 2003) [hereinafter AQUINAS, ON EVIL] (“[E]vil as such cannot be intended, nor
in any way willed or desired, since being desirable has the nature of good, to which
evil as such is contrary.”).
59
See also SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 75, art. 1, at 927
(“[T]he will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and
intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of
the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results
from the lack of direction in the will.”).
60
Id. pt. I-II, Q. 18, art. 4 & ad. 3, at 665. Aquinas states that “the aspect of
good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end,
but also in the means.” Id. pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2, at 627. Insofar as Aquinas
distinguishes between end and object, he refers to the object that is found in the
means. Aquinas states that “whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act,
and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances,” and these are
considered like the substance of an act for the goodness that derives from “their
utility to the end.” Id. pt. I-II, Q. 7, art. 1, at 623 and art. 2, ad. 1, at 624.
61
See id. pt. I-II, Q. 8, art. 2, at 627 (“[T]he means are good and willed, not in
themselves, but as referred to the end.”).
62
AQUINAS, supra note 50, at BOOK THREE: PART VI.
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quantity of the harm done [by the trampling] aggravates the
sin.”63 So the circumstances being voluntary can cause the act to
be prohibited if the circumstances are evil.64
This brings us to the case of self-defense. Although Boyle
tries to define intention for Aquinas in the case of self-defense in
the manner Aquinas used it in the cases of throwing overboard
and trampling underfoot, Aquinas cannot have used the term in
the case of self-defense to refer only to the last end. Aquinas
states that the “act [of killing], since one’s intention is to save
one’s own life, is not unlawful.”65 This statement justifies an act
of killing when it is within the intention to save, but we have
already seen that the fact that something is not within the
intention of the end does not justify the means or the
circumstances. Therefore, the intention to save in self-defense
63

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 916.
Warren Quinn states that Aquinas “seems to think that foreseeable harm
that comes from action is automatically voluntary . . . . [and] that foreseeable harm
coming from inaction is voluntary only when the agent could and should have acted
to prevent it.” Quinn, Actions, supra note 42, at 291–92. He then goes on to say that
for Aquinas the pursuit of goods in such cases of foreseeable harm is not justified,
whereas it is justified for “the foreseeably harmful inactions that could not or need
not have been avoided.” Id. at 292. This is a fair assessment of Aquinas’s position.
Aquinas states that “those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to
move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but
also act for an end . . . . [and] the movements of such things are said to be
voluntary.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 6, art. 1, at 616. In this
case the end is foreseen. He also speaks of a foreseeable end when he states that
“[i]f, on the other hand, harm follow directly from the sinful act, although it be
neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is
directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin.” Id.
pt. I-II, Q. 73, art. 8, at 916. Furthermore, Aquinas states that “[w]e apply the word
voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action;
but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction,” although “the
cause of what follows from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but
only then when the agent can and ought to act” as in the case of a helmsman who
has a duty to steer the ship properly. Id. pt. I-II, Q. 6, art. 3 & ad. 1, at 618.
However, Quinn does not accept Aquinas’s qualification of acts on this basis for two
reasons. He thinks that Aquinas would be too rigid in keeping to the rules and that
it violates Aquinas’s theory of causality. Quinn, Actions, supra note 42, at 293.
Quinn’s reasons fail to appreciate Aquinas’s flexibility in the application of rules and
mistake Aquinas’s concept of final causality with efficient causality. See, e.g., SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 51, art. 4, at 1411 (giving an example of the
virtue of gnome whereby one avoids the application of a common rule of action by
judging a matter according to higher matters); see also id. pt. I-II, Q. 1, art. 1 & ad.
1, at 583 (stating that acts proceeding from the will, as they do, “are caused by that
power in accordance with the nature of its object. . . . [which] is the end and the
good . . . . [and the end] is first in the order of the agent’s intention . . . . [and thus] a
cause.”).
65
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
64
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must refer broadly to what is willed—not only as an end but also
as a means and as circumstances—and nothing that is willed in
justified self-defense can be evil in any of these three ways.
In what appears to be a move to solidify this broad
understanding of intent for his treatment of self-defense,
Aquinas proceeds immediately in the article after his article on
self-defense to designate what is beside the intention as chance
happenings. He states that, according to Aristotle, “chance is a
cause that acts beside one’s intention,” and concludes that
“[h]ence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither
intended nor voluntary,” and “as such, are not sins.”66 Aquinas
defines chance happenings as what is not foreseen unless it “be
either an invariable or a frequent consequence of what is
intended, [in which case] it does not occur fortuitously or by
chance.”67 Therefore, what is intended in self-defense is what is
willed and includes all that is foreseen as an end, a means, or a
consequence.
Aquinas's definition of intention as what is willed also
appears in his reference to intention of the means in addition to
that of the end when he states that “it is not lawful for a man to
intend killing a man in self-defense,”68 and when he refers to “the
case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from
death.”69 In other words, the “word intention indicates an act of
66

Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472. In that same article, Aquinas adds that
“what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, [may be] voluntary and
intended accidentally” if a person “does not remove something whence homicide
results whereas he ought to remove it,” so that “if he be occupied with something
unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape
being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's death.” Id. This covers cases
of felony murder and negligent homicide.
67
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK THREE: PART I, at
45 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975) (1956); see also
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684 (where Aquinas
states that if the consequences of an action are foreseen or “if the consequences are
not foreseen, . . . . [and] follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of
cases, . . . the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action, . . . . [but]
if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the
goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that
which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of
itself”).
68
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471
(emphasis added).
69
See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, ad. 1, at 1471 (emphasis added). Aquinas adds
that Augustine “says pointedly, for the sake of these things, whereby he indicates the
intention.” Id. Joseph Mangan finds further support for this meaning in the way
Aquinas treats killing in self-defense by public authority. He points out that

2018]

AQUINAS RECONSIDERED

81

the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders
something to the end,”70—an act of will that incorporates the end
and the something ordered to the end. Aquinas states in his
commentary on Aristotle that
if someone wills some cause from which he knows that a
particular effect results, . . . . although he may well not will that
effect in itself, nevertheless he rather wills that effect to exist
than that the cause not exist, . . . . so it is unreasonable for
someone to will to do unjust things and not will to be unjust.71

The willing of the end includes the willing of the means.
A small number of commentators on Aquinas are in accord
with this interpretation of intention in Aquinas’s discussion of
self-defense.72 Elizabeth Anscombe states that the doctrine of
“according to St. Thomas’ own use of the word in article seven, ‘to intend’ also
signifies to intend as a means to an end; for he limits the lawfulness of killing by
public authority to killing as a means, or as an intermediary end, or as a proximate
end to that of the common good.” Joseph Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the
Principle of Double Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 41, 49 (1949).
70
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 1, ad. 3, at 640.
71
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SENTENTIA LIBRI ETHICORUM lib. 3, lect. 12, n.6
(Roma: Commissio Leonina 1969), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ctc02.html (“Si
enim aliquis vult aliquam causam ex qua scit sequi talem effectum, . . . . [q]uamvis
forte non velit illum effectum secundum se, potius tamen vult illum effectum esse
quam causa non sit. . . . ergo irrationabile est quod aliquis velit iniusta facere et non
velit esse iniustus . . . .”).
72
There are also a number of ways, such as the following, which agree neither
with this definition of intention nor one based on the doctrine of double effect:
One way to interpret “intention” is to refer it solely to the end desired and not
the means. This interpretation has been refuted in the literature. See, e.g., the
careful analysis of Jean Porter who states that “this line of analysis can justify
almost anything” and that rather, according to Aquinas, “we can legitimately say
that the agent intends an act that is chosen as a means towards, or a way of
enjoying some more ultimate end.” Jean Porter, Choice, Causality, and Relation:
Aquinas’s Analysis of the Moral Act and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 89 AM. CATH.
PHIL. Q. 479, 480 (2015). Nevertheless, Porter believes that Aquinas allows killing in
self-defense when there is no other alternative possible. Consequently, the
application of her excellent analysis of intention to Aquinas’s discussion of selfdefense is somewhat torturous and ultimately does not explain why Aquinas uses
the term “intent” in his discussion of self-defense in the way he does. See id. at 497–
501 (applying her analysis of intention).
Andrew Jaspers states (correctly in my opinion) that Aquinas, in SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 1, ad. 3, at 640, “implies that the
criteria for determining the moral specification of the means to an end will be the
same as those of the end.” Andrew Jaspers, Intentio and Praeter Intentionem in the
Constitution of the Moral Object in Thomas Aquinas, 81 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL.
ASS’N 149, 152 (2007). However, he adds a caveat to his interpretation of SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 (incorrectly in my opinion)
that the circumstance of self-defense “fundamentally change[s] the constitution of
the moral object so as to make an otherwise questionable end a legitimate one.” Id.

82

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 57:67

Steven Long includes the essential matter of an act, such as its lethality, in the
moral object but derives the act’s species from the end to which it is ordered, such as
self-defense, so that one is permitted to use a lethal self-defense if necessary to
survive. See Steven A. Long, A Brief Disquisition Regarding the Nature of the Object
of the Moral Act According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 67 THOMIST 45, 70 (2003),
critiqued by Steven Jensen in A Long Discussion Regarding Steven A. Long’s
Interpretation of the Moral Species, 67 THOMIST 623, 623–43 (2003) [hereinafter
Jensen, Long Discussion], to which Long replied in Response to Jensen on the Moral
Object, 3 NOVA ET VETERA 101, 101–08 (2005), to which Jensen replied in The Role
of Teleology in the Moral Species, 63 REV. METAPHYSICS 3, 3–27 (2009), to which
Long replied in Engaging Thomist Interlocutors, 9 NOVA ET VETERA 267, 267–95
(2011). See generally STEVEN A. LONG, THE TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR OF THE MORAL
ACT 10–31 (2007) [hereinafter LONG, TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR], for Long’s theory.
Long justifies the lethality of an act of killing in self-defense (including the killing of
a mentally incompetent aggressor) by its per se order to the end of self-defense, but
he does not explain why the lethality of an act of killing to save the mother’s life in a
craniotomy (which he recognizes as an act with the same structure as self-defense) is
not also justified by its per se order to the end of saving the mother—except to say
that to “kill an innocent child [in a craniotomy] is under negative precept.” Id. at 104
n.1. Long leaves unexplained why killing an innocent child is under negative precept
and killing a faultless aggressor is not.
Gregory Reichberg argues that Aquinas uses intention to refer to the purpose of
avenging a wrong and qualifies that which refers to the purpose of defending oneself
as outside intention. Claiming support from the work of Hugo Grotius and Francisco
de Vitoria, he interprets Aquinas as saying that, when there is no other means of
escape, it is permissible to have the purpose to kill without it being intended. See
GREGORY M. REICHBERG, THOMAS AQUINAS ON WAR AND PEACE 174, 183–85 (2017).
However, to support his thesis, Reichberg uses sources to which Aquinas does not
refer, and he seemingly ignores the importance of Aquinas’s reference to Augustine’s
DE LIBERO ARBITRIO which, as Reichberg acknowledges, denies the use of foreseen
lethal force in self-defense. Id. at 185–92. He also uses the reference to Augustine’s
Letter 47 to Publicola apparently as support for the prohibition on revenge. Id. at
187–88. However, Reichberg omits to state that Augustine tells Publicola that he
disagrees “with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him.”
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, obj. 1 & ad. 1, at 1471
(quoting and approving AUGUSTINE, LETTER 47 TO PUBLICOLA (Ep. xlvii) ¶ 5 (398)).
Although Reichberg may be right that there were some canonists who were willing
to advocate a foreseen lethal defense in the absence of any other escape, there is no
evidence that Aquinas adopted their point of view, especially given Aquinas’s direct
reference to Augustine’s prohibition. Rather, it appears Aquinas defines intention
precisely as what Reichberg rejects—“as a pure and simple synonym of voluntas
(volition), which broadly designates a determination of the will (and hence is
applicable both to the intention of the end and the choice of a means).” REICHBERG,
supra, at 194. Reichberg rejects the case that Aquinas uses for what is outside
intention, which is an accidental homicide where one takes the risk that his act will
kill the aggressor but does not know it will. Id. at 177.
Daniel Weiss states that for Aquinas “an action that foreknowingly causes the
death of innocents can never be legitimate, regardless of whether that action causes
death ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly.’ ” Daniel H. Weiss, Aquinas’s Opposition to Killing the
Innocent and its Distinctiveness Within the Christian Just War Tradition, 45 J. REL.
ETHICS 481, 486 (2017). In his discussion opposing the application of the
intended/foreseen distinction of the double effect doctrine to cases of innocent
deaths, Weiss makes two arguments that are notable. First, he points to the fact
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double effect is incorrectly ascribed to Aquinas insofar as it
excludes from an agent’s intention the side effects of an act that
are foreseen but not the purpose of the act.73 Thomas Cavanaugh
interprets Aquinas to define intention in self-defense as
knowingly and willingly killing another as an inevitable
consequence, and he states that what is beside intention is a
risked killing which results from “knowingly and willingly
endangering another’s life and thereby killing.”74 He states that
Aquinas does not allow intentional killing even if it is the only
that in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, Aquinas
distinguishes between a legitimate act, in which an agent who does not foresee the
death his act will cause exercises due care, and an illegitimate act in which an agent
who does not foresee the death his act will cause does not exercise due care. Id. at
489. Weiss then argues that “if liability holds even without presuming the agent’s
conscious awareness of the danger, an agent would be liable a fortiori in a situation
in which she was consciously aware that the action could likely cause death, and yet
engaged in the action nevertheless.” Id. at 489–90 (citing DANIEL M. BELL JR., JUST
WAR AS CHRISTIAN DISCIPLESHIP: RECENTERING THE TRADITION IN THE CHURCH
RATHER THAN THE STATE 218 (2009)). Second, he points to Aquinas’s discussion of
the parable of the wheat and the tares (Matthew 13:24-30) on the basis of which
Aquinas says, if one has to choose between unintentionally killing the
innocent while seeking justly to slay sinners, on the one hand, or refraining
from slaying the wicked because doing so would unintentionally kill the
innocent, on the other hand, one should choose the latter, even if it means
letting the wicked go unpunished for the time being.
Id. at 494; accord BELL, supra, at 217. However, Weiss does not extend his argument
to the aggressor in a case of self-defense. He interprets Aquinas in SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, as addressing and
legitimating the killing of an unjust and sinful attacker. He states, “Aquinas holds
that in the case of self-defense a private individual is permitted to engage in actions
that cause the death of the sinful attacker if that is the only way that the attack can
be prevented” as long as “the individual intends simply to ward off the attack.” Id. at
492. Weiss does not consider that the aggressor in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note
1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, need not be unjust or sinful and that Aquinas’s
opposition to the doctrine of double effect for private individuals in the case of those
who are innocent also applies in the case of those who are unjust and sinful—in
other words, that Aquinas opposes private acts that foresee the deaths of sinful as
well as innocent people.
For an extended discussion of several other definitions of intention and the
problems they present, see Joseph Shaw, Intention in Ethics, 36 CAN. J. PHIL. 187,
187–223 (2006).
73
G.E.M. Anscombe, Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’,
56 PROC. AM. CATH. PHIL. ASS’N 12, 23–25 (1982).
74
T.C. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING
EVIL 10 (2006) [hereinafter CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT]. For a good discussion of
Aquinas’s notion of risked killing, see Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s Account of
Double Effect, 61 THOMIST 107, 111–19 (1997) [hereinafter Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s
Account]. Cavanaugh also sees a third category of accidental killing to be
distinguished from risked killing. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT, supra, at 10.
Aquinas treats accidental killing in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q.
64, art. 8, at 1472.
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means to save one’s life,75 but “risking another’s life is not
intending the other’s death,”76 and “an action in which the
defendant risks killing the assailant” is permitted.77 Steven
Jensen also interprets Aquinas to define intention in self-defense
as knowingly and willingly killing another as an unavoidable
consequence, and he states that Aquinas prohibits such
intentional killing even when it is the only way to preserve one’s
life from attack.78 He states that if the act is not a knowing and
willing killing, such as an act to save oneself by deflecting an
attack with a sword, the act is permitted even if the act results
incidentally in the killing of the assailant.79 Denis Sullivan
introduces an interesting twist on Aquinas’s use of intention in
his discussion of self-defense. He interprets Aquinas to define
intention as referring only to the final end and therefore as not
relevant to the determination of which killings (as means or side

75

CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT, supra note 74, at 10.
Id. at 11.
77
Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s Account, supra note 74, at 109. Drawing on the words
of John Paul II, Cavanaugh states that “[t]hose who witness to justice by forgoing
those acts by which they could save themselves [in situations where the only chance
to save oneself is to knowingly kill an aggressor] merit recognition as martyrs,” and
the choice of martyrdom to do the just thing in this situation is not merely faithbased but also rational. Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Double-Effect Reasoning,
Craniotomy, and Vital Conflicts: A Case of Contemporary Catholic Casuistry, 11
NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 453, 462–63 (2011).
78
Steven J. Jensen, The Trouble with Secunda Secundae 64, 7: Self-Defense, 83
MOD. SCHOOLMAN 143, 144 (2006) [hereinafter Jensen, The Trouble]. As for “actions
in which we kill as a means to preserve our lives,” Jensen states that “I think that
such actions are justified, but then I also think that STh II-II, q. 64, a. 7 does not
justify them.” Jensen, Long Discussion, supra note 72, at 643.
79
Jensen, The Trouble, supra note 78, at 143–44, 153–54. Jensen does suggest
an alternative account based on his read of other passages in Aquinas that would
permit a defender, in the absence of public officials who can help, to assume the role
of a public official who is permitted to kill. Id. at 154. However, Jensen’s support for
this alternative account is weak. He cites to SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt.
II-II, Q. 40, art. 1, ad. 1, at 1360, which he says “recognizes that the private
individual can sometimes be charged with public authority.” Jensen, The Trouble,
supra note 78, at 162 n.45. But this source states only that
to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the
sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by
the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to take the sword, but to use it as
commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 40, art. 1, ad. 1, at 1360. The focus is
on a private individual being “commissioned by another,” not on a private individual
assuming the status on her own. Be that as it may, Jensen nevertheless emphasizes
that one cannot derive such an interpretation legitimately from Aquinas’s discussion
of self-defense as many commentators attempt to do through the doctrine of double
effect. Jensen, The Trouble, supra note 78, at 154–56.
76
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effects) in self-defense are permitted.80 According to Sullivan,
Aquinas always prohibits killing as a means and sometimes
prohibits killing as a side effect, but means and side effects are
always outside intention. Sullivan then uses certain phrases in
Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense to show that, when a killing
is a side effect, it is prohibited when it is foreseen as a certainty
and permitted only when it is seen merely as a risk.81
The analysis in this Article argues for an interpretation of
Aquinas that prohibits an act of self-defense in which one
foresees another’s death from an attack on the vital life support
of that other, and that permits an act of self-defense in which
there is only a risk of another’s death. It does not restrict
Aquinas’s definition of intention only to the end as Sullivan does,
but sees intention in Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense as an
act of will embracing any death that is foreseen to result from the
act. Therefore, it rejects Boyle’s doctrine of double effect. When
Aquinas states that “it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a
man in self-defense,”82 he means to include foreseen killings
within the meaning of “intend.” Thus, he prohibits the foreseen
killing of an aggressor even if killing the aggressor is the only
way in which one can save one’s own life.
Most people today do not accept the moral soundness of this
prohibition. The Catholic Church herself permits killing in selfdefense when the only way to save one’s life is by killing an
aggressor.83 Yet, as shown above, Aquinas maintains that God
retains authority over the life and death of the human person, a
person made in the image of God, and one should love one’s
neighbor for God’s sake. Even though one’s basic natural
80

Denis F. Sullivan, The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of Moral
Responsibility, 64 THOMIST 423, 437 (2000).
81
Id. at 423–24, 435–37, 448.
82
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
83
The encyclical EVANGELIUM VITAE by Pope Saint John Paul II states that “it
happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes
involves taking his life.” JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE
(THE GOSPEL OF LIFE) ¶ 55 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE]. The CATECHISM
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 13, at ¶ 2264, states that “[s]omeone who
defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a
lethal blow.” Both sources cite to SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64,
art. 7, at 1471, Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense, as authority for this position. See
id. at n.66; EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra, at n.45. I do not oppose the teaching of the
Catholic Church. I do interpret SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64,
art. 7, at 1471, differently to mandate a prohibition against killing even in the case
where one will lose one’s life and the lives of one’s loved ones to an aggressor if the
aggressor is not killed.
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inclination is to preserve oneself and one’s loved ones,84 this
inclination should be governed by one’s charitable love of God.
We are created to love God85 and have our being in God.86 This is
what makes us human.
Therefore, one finds the real
preservation of self in loving God and not in turning away from
Him in sin. Aquinas notes that “nobody may lawfully commit
simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to
save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the
life of the body.”87 Likewise, in the case of killing, which is a
more serious offense,88 one must rise above the natural desire to
kill in self-defense to the charitable desire to preserve one’s
spiritual life through loving God in fellowship with one’s
neighbor.
Aquinas is not alone in advocating a prohibition of killing in
self-defense. Augustine likewise condemns self-defensive killing
when he says that to arm oneself against one’s neighbor may
arise from “a warmth of spirit capable of good” or from a “hatred
of the injustice of others,” but this “carnal love” is nevertheless a
sin.89 Aquinas affirms Augustine by quoting two passages from
84

Aquinas himself affirms that “in man there is first of all an inclination to good
in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances:
inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its
nature.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 94, art. 2, at 1009.
85
Id. pt. I, Q. 60, art. 5, at 301.
86
Id. pt. I, Q. 18, art. 4 & ad. 1, at 102.
87
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, obj. 4, at 1471, which Aquinas implicitly affirms in
his answer to this objection. The objector has suggested that since one cannot
fornicate or commit adultery to save one’s own life, “no man may lawfully take
another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life.” Id. Aquinas replies that
“[t]he act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of
one’s own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man’s life.” Id.
pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, ad. 4, at 1472. In other words, since one can defend oneself
with moderation even if it might (but not necessarily will) kill the other person,
there will be times when the aggressor will be killed.
88
Aquinas states that “it is evident that fornication and adultery are less
grievous sins than taking a man’s, especially one’s own, life: since the latter is most
grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love.” Id. pt. IIII, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469.
89
Augustine states that:
[H]e uses the sword, who, without the command or sanction of any
superior, or legitimate authority, arms himself against man’s life. For truly
the Lord had given commandment to His disciples to take the sword, but
not to smite with the sword. Was it then at all unbeseeming that Peter
after this sin [his move to cut off the servant’s ear in the Garden of
Gethsemane] should become ruler of the Church, as Moses after smiting
the Egyptian was made ruler and chief of the Synagogue? For both
transgressed the rule not through hardened ferocity, but through a warmth
of spirit capable of good; both through hatred of the injustice of others; both
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his work. In one, Augustine tells Publicola that he disagrees
“with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by
him.”90 In the other, Augustine approves Evodius who questions
how men can be “free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who
are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these contemptible
things [that is, one’s own life].”91 Aquinas notes that “[t]he words

sinned through love, the one for his brother, the other for his Lord, though
a carnal love.
AUGUSTINE, REPLY TO FAUSTUS THE MANICHÆAN 22.70, in THOMAS AQUINAS,
CATENA AUREA: GOSPEL OF MATTHEW 26.51–54 (John Henry Parker trans., London
1842). Ambrose refers to the same passage in Matthew 26:52 and states that “when
[a Christian, a just and a wise man] meets with an armed robber he cannot return
his blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbor.”
AMBROSE, ON THE DUTIES OF THE CLERGY III, 4.27 (H. de Romestin trans.), in 10
NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, SECOND SERIES 71 (Philip Schaff and Henry
Wace eds. 2004) (1896) [hereinafter 10 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS].
90
AUGUSTINE, LETTER 47 TO PUBLICOLA (Ep. xlvii) ¶ 5 (398), as quoted and
approved by Aquinas in SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7,
obj. 1 & ad. 1, at 1471. Augustine’s letter to Publicola mentions cases that are not
killings when one’s instruments are used by others, such as when a man is killed by
one’s wall falling upon that man when that man is throwing it down, or when one’s
ox may gore or one’s horse may kick a man to death, and he confirms the liceity of
owning these instruments despite their being used in an act that results in death
because the act does not intend the death. AUGUSTINE, LETTER XLVII OF LETTERS
OF ST. AUGUSTINE, in 1 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, FIRST SERIES 293–94
(Philip Schaff ed., 2004) (1886). Augustine states that the passage in the Sermon on
the Mount in which Christ teaches to resist not evil is “not to make us neglect the
duty of restraining men from sin,” but “[a]s to killing others [in one’s private
capacity] in order to defend one’s own life, I do not approve of this.” Id. at 293,
referring to the passage in Matthew 5:39.
91
AUGUSTINE, DE LIBERO ARBITRIO 1.5, as quoted and approved by Aquinas in
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, obj. 2 & ad. 1, at 1471. In
this same passage Augustine states that “the law is not just which grants a traveler
the power to kill a highway robber so that he himself may not be killed.” ST.
AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL I, ¶ 33 (Anna S. Benjamin and L.H.
Hackstaff trans. 1964, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 2d Prtg. 1964). There is
nothing to suggest that either Augustine or Aquinas are thinking of a premeditated
situation such as Kevin Flannery suggests when he uses the example of “a man
[who] has a neighbor whom he thinks could very well attack him someday, so he
eliminates that threat in advance by means of a private execution.” Kevin L.
Flannery, The Division of Action in Thomas Aquinas, 83 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 421, 433
(2009). Rather, the mention of a highway robber indicates that Augustine, and
Aquinas who agrees with him, are thinking of an immediate threat that one will be
killed unless one kills one’s assailant, and it is not a just act to take the assailant’s
life in order to save one’s own. On another note, in anticipation of Ghandi who will
be discussed shortly in note 107, infra, it is interesting that Bonaventure cites to
Augustine’s DE LIBERO ARBITRIO to maintain that a perfect person is not allowed to
kill in order to save oneself from death but that such a killing is excusable in an
imperfect person. BONAVENTURE, COLLATIONS ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS 87–88
(F. Edward Coughlin ed., Paul Spaeth trans. 1995). Aquinas does not address this
last point.
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quoted from Augustine [in each of these texts] refer to the case
when one man intends to kill another to save himself from
death.”92
There is also a history of support for the prohibition against
a private individual’s foreseen killing behind Aquinas’s reference
to the jurists in his discussion of self-defense, according to whom
“it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed
the limits of a blameless defense.”93 There is no indication in this
passage that, if the force is foreseen to kill, the killing constitutes
a blameless defense. Rather, as one commentator states, “the
prerogative to use force to repel force [in this passage] seems to
be restricted to public authority alone.”94 The early Church
Fathers’ doctrine supports this restriction. Origen speaks of the
Christians as “adopt[ing] laws of so exceedingly mild a character
as not to allow them, when it was their fate to be slain as sheep,
on any occasion to resist their persecutors.”95 Cyprian mentions
the soldiers of Christ in battle who “do not in turn assail their
assailants, since it is not lawful for the innocent even to kill the
guilty.”96 Lactantius states that “if any violence is offered to us,
we must endure it with equanimity, since the death of an
innocent person cannot be unavenged, and since we have a great
Judge who alone always has the power of taking vengeance in
His hands.”97 This doctrine extended beyond personal defense

92

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, ad. 1, at 1471.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 (citing Pope Gregory IX, DECRETAL
SIGNIFICASTI in DE HOMICIDIO c. XVIII, in DECRETALES GREGORII P. IX lib. V, tit.
XII). The summary quote by Aquinas is “vim vi repellere licet cum moderamine
inculpatae tutelae.” ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art.
7, at 12 (Leonine ed., 1897), http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth3061.html. The
full passage reads: “all laws and rights permit the repulsion of force by force; except
that it should be within the limits of a blameless defense, not to take vengeance, but
to repulse injury (vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittant; quia tamen
id debet fieri cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam, sed
ad iniuriam propulsandam).” DECRETALIUM COLLECTIONES, in 2 CORPUS JURIS
CANONICI 801 (Aemilius Ludwig Richter ed., 2nd ed., Leipzig, Tauchnitz 1881) (my
translation).
94
Rojas, supra note 38, at 99.
95
ORIGEN, AGAINST CELSUS III.6, in 4 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS 467 (Alexander
Roberts and James Donaldson eds., 2008) (1885) [hereinafter ANTE-NICENE
FATHERS].
96
CYPRIAN, EPISTLE LVI TO CORNELIUS IN EXILE, CONCERNING HIS
CONFESSION, in 5 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 95, at 351.
97
LACTANTIUS, THE DIVINE INSTITUTES III, 18, in 7 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS,
supra note 95, at 89. For these and other examples of the prohibition by the early
Church Fathers of foreseen lethal defenses, see generally THE EARLY CHURCH ON
93
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even to war and the administration of justice.98 With the Edict of
Milan, which established the religious toleration of Christianity
in the Roman Empire in 313, the prohibition against killing by
those with public responsibility was relaxed, but the prohibition
against killing in self-defense by a private individual remained a
doctrine of the Church for several centuries thereafter, even up
to the time of Gratian less than a century before Aquinas’s
reference to the jurists.99
In modern times a number of important voices have
condemned self-defensive killing. Mahatma Ghandi understood
all too well the difficulty in this restraint, but he advocated nonviolence (ahimsa) in the face of death from an aggressor. He
stated that “[a] non-violent man or woman will and should die
without retaliation, anger or malice, in self-defense or in
defending the honor of his women folk.100 He called it “the
highest form of bravery”101 because it is not easy to attain this
spirit of non-violence. It requires “as complete self-purification
as is humanly possible,” which “is a matter of long training in
self-denial and appreciation of the hidden forces within
ourselves.”102 Ghandi remarked that “[n]on-violence is impossible
KILLING: A COMPREHENSIVE SOURCEBOOK ON WAR, ABORTION, AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (Ronald J. Sider ed., 2012).
98
C. John Cadoux states:
that in the third century the conviction that Christianity was incompatible
with the shedding of blood, either in war or in the administration of justice,
was not only maintained and vigorously defended by eminent individuals
like Tertullianus of Carthago, Hippolutos of Rome, and Origenes of
Palestine and Egypt, but was widely held and acted on in the Churches up
and down Christendom.
C. JOHN CADOUX, THE EARLY CHRISTIAN ATTITUDE TO WAR: A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 128 (1919).
99
See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A
HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING 218, 220–21 (1988) (citing Ambrose and Augustine
in the fourth century and the Decretum of Gratian in the twelfth century). Gratian
discusses self-defense and killing in Cause 23 of the Decretum. See, e.g., Decreti
Secunda Pars C. 23 q. 5 c. 8 of Decretum Magistri Gratiani, in 1 CORPUS JURIS
CANONICI 932 (Aemilius Ludwig Richter ed., 2d ed., Leipzig, Tauchnitz, 1879). Rojas
translates this passage as, “it is prohibited by this precept [against killing] that
anyone on his own authority be armed to murder anyone, not that the accused be
put to death by command of the law.” Rojas, supra note 38, at 98.
100
MOHANDAS GHANDI, GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE: SELECTED TEXTS FROM
MOHANDAS K. GHANDI’S NON-VIOLENCE IN PEACE AND WAR 46 (Thomas Merton ed.,
1965).
101
Id. at 46.
102
Id. at 36. Thomas Merton captured the essence of Ghandi’s spirit of nonviolence when he said that it “sprang from an inner realization of spiritual unity in
himself”; it was not “a means of achieving unity” but rather “the fruit of inner unity
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without humility” and can only be sustained “by the higher
promptings of an unseen power.”103 It requires “a living belief in
God.”104 Ghandi said that Jesus gives us a good example.105 Only
if God instills within one the charity by which one feels one with
one’s opponent—so that “it is better that you should die at his
hands than that he, your ignorant brother, should die at yours”—
can one practice non-violence.106 Ghandi recognized that not all
can practice this bravery based on charity. He continues on to
say that “[i]f the people are not ready for the exercise of the nonviolence of the brave, they must be ready for the use of force in
self-defense” because “[t]here is nothing more demoralizing than
fake non-violence of the weak and impotent.”107
As Thomas Merton remarks, Ghandi’s non-violence is “not a
sentimental evasion or denial of the reality of evil,” but rather “a
clearsighted acceptance of the necessity to use the force and the
presence of evil as a fulcrum for good and for liberation.”108 It is
the refusal to cooperate with evil and the determination to
overcome evil by the mercy of forgiving the oppressor and
“assum[ing] the common burden of evil which weighs both on

already achieved.” Thomas Merton, Introduction to GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE,
supra note 100, at 10. Merton adds:
Indeed this is the explanation for Gandhi’s apparent failure (which became
evident to him at the end of his own life). He saw that his followers had not
reached the inner unity that he had realized in himself, and that their
satyagraha was to a great extent a pretense, since they believed it to be a
means to achieve unity and freedom, while he saw that it must necessarily
be the fruit of inner freedom.
Id.
103
GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE, supra note 100, at 50. Ghandi adds that if it had
been through his own will, he “should have miserably failed.” Id.
104
Id. at 63.
105
Id. at 55 (“Jesus was the most active resister known perhaps to history. This
was non-violence par excellence.”).
106
Id. at 82–83.
107
Id. at 56. Ghandi explained that
[i]f an individual or group of people are unable or unwilling to follow this
great law of life, retaliation or resistance unto death is the second best
though a long way off from the first. Cowardice is impotence worse than
violence. The coward desires revenge but being afraid to die, he looks to
others, maybe to the government of the day, to do the work of defense for
him.
Id. at 46–47. Ghandi’s position is reminiscent of that of Bonaventure who cites to
Augustine’s DE LIBERO ARBITRIO to maintain that a perfect person is not allowed to
kill in order to save oneself from death but that such a killing is excusable in an
imperfect person. BONAVENTURE, supra note 91, at 87–88.
108
Merton, supra note 102, at 18.
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oneself and one’s adversary.”109 Ghandi recognized that the
difficulty that one has in achieving this state of ahimsa (nonviolence) leads many to fail. In fact, at the end of his life he felt
that he himself had failed to attain “sufficient detachment and
control over [his] temper and emotions” so as to bring nonviolence to India.110 What he thought was ahimsa among his
followers turned out merely to be the “passive resistance . . . of
the weak.”111 Nevertheless, he continued to proclaim that there
was “no hope for the aching world except through the narrow and
straight path of non-violence.”112
Dorothy Day, a journalist and Catholic convert who cofounded the Catholic Worker movement in the United States,
and Johannes Ude, a Catholic priest and theologian in Austria,
both lived in the early twentieth century and actively advocated
restraint from killing in self-defense. Dorothy Day states:
It is a natural right, as taught by the Church, and it is only
because of the life of grace, opened to us by the coming of Jesus,
that we hold to our pacifist stand throughout race war, class
war and every other type of war. As a pacifist, and my pacifism
is based on the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount, I must
accept the supernatural point of view and the idea that absolute
pacifism is to be aimed at.113

Johannes Ude maintains that “those Christian moral
philosophers and theologians who approve of self-defense grant
the right of killing one’s aggressor if one cannot otherwise defend
oneself,” but “Christ demands exactly the opposite . . . .”114
Quoting from the Sermon on the Mount, he reminds us that
“Christ says, ‘Do not resist evil,’ ” and this means that “the
advocates of self-defense are wrong in saying one may kill an
attacker if it is necessary.”115 Thus both these great advocates

109
Id. at 18–19, 22–23. Non-violence is love “lived in the face of untruth and
hatred, the persistent and flagrant denial of love.” Id. at 17.
110
GHANDI ON NON-VIOLENCE, supra note 100, at 92.
111
Id. at 93.
112
Id. at 92.
113
Dave Dellinger, Robert Franklin Williams, Martin Luther King, Jr., &
Dorothy Day, Are Pacifists Willing to Be Negroes? A 1950s Dialogue on Fighting
Racism and Militarism, Using Nonviolence and Armed Struggle, in WE HAVE NOT
BEEN MOVED: RESISTING RACISM AND MILITARISM IN 21ST CENTURY AMERICA 21, 32
(Elizabeth Martínez et al. eds., 2012).
114
JOHANNES UDE, YOU SHALL NOT KILL 47 (Ingrid M. Leder trans., 2016).
115
Id.
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support Aquinas’s position that when it is a choice between an
individual’s killing in self-defense or accepting death, one should
aim at absolute pacifism.
Leo Tolstoy, who greatly influenced Ghandi in his thinking,
was himself greatly influenced by the passage in the Sermon on
the Mount where Christ taught that one must not resist evil. In
one of his letters, Tolstoy asks “[h]ow (to use the stock example)
is a man to act when he sees a criminal killing or outraging a
child, and he can only save the child by killing the criminal?”: His
answer is that
[i]f a man be a Christian, and consequently acknowledges God,
and sees the meaning of life in fulfilling His will, then, however
ferocious the assailant, however innocent or lovely the child, he
has even less ground to abandon the God-given law, and to do to
the criminal as the criminal wishes to do to the child.”116

Aquinas is not a pacifist insofar as he allows killing by one
acting under public authority117 and insofar as he allows acts of
self-defense that put an aggressor at risk of death118 even when
116
Letter from Leo Tolstoy to Ernest Howard Crosby (Jan. 12, 1896), in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF LYOF N. TOLSTOI: ESSAYS, LETTER, MISCELLANIES 324, 330–31
(1899). For an elaboration of Tolstoy’s doctrine, see generally LEO TOLSTOY, ‘THE
KINGDOM OF GOD IS WITHIN YOU:’ CHRISTIANITY NOT AS A MYSTIC RELIGION BUT AS
A NEW THEORY OF LIFE 1–48, 184–208 (Constance Garnett trans., William
Heinemann, London 1894).
117
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, where
Aquinas says that
it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for
such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in selfdefense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting
against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers,
although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.
This relegation of killing for the common good to only those who have public
authority is reiterated in other parts of his discussion of murder. See id. pt. II-II, Q.
64, art. 3, at 1467–1468 (“[T]he care of the common good is entrusted to persons of
rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can
lawfully put evildoers to death.”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469 (“[I]t is not
lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority.”). Therefore,
when an individual acts on his own authority, it is in no way lawful to kill any
person, innocent or otherwise. See id.
118
Aquinas states that it is not “necessary for salvation that a man omit the act
of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to
take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
In other words, there is no unlawfulness in the killing of another as long as one does
not know that he will take the other’s life by his act. One can defend up to the point
that one becomes certain that the other will be killed, but at that point the defender
must refrain because the killing becomes foreseen and therefore a matter of
intention and “it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense . . . .”
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. Short of the point of killing, moderate self-defense
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the aggressor is an innocent person.119 He understands the
passage in Matthew 5:39 where Christ admonishes “not to resist
evil” in two ways. One may forgive the wrong done to oneself,
which is a good interpretation, or one can tolerate the wrongs
done to others, which is a bad interpretation “if one be able to
resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner.”120 He then quotes
from Ambrose to explain that a becoming manner is full justice—
“[t]he courage whereby a man in battle defends his country
against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends
against robbers . . . .”121 What are not becoming are acts of
foreseen killings.122
There are some saving acts in which the death of another
may be foreseen and could be prevented, but they are not
killings. Aquinas permits, or arguably permits, these saving acts
and even praises them when they result in the sacrifice of oneself
out of charity. The next Section examines these situations.

can take the risk that the other’s life may be taken, as long as the defense is in
“proportion to the end” in the sense that it does not use “more than necessary
violence” or require killing the other person. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
Aquinas confirms in another passage that “if his sole intention be to withstand the
injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, . . . .” Id.
pt. II-II, Q. 41, art. 1, at 1363.
119
In his discussion of self-defense, Aquinas uses the term aggressor, not unjust
aggressor, to refer to a person against whom one acts in self-defense. See id. pt. II-II,
Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. By defining aggressor broadly, Aquinas includes an insane
aggressor to whom no fault can be attributed, thereby including an innocent person
within the term.
120
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 188, art. 3, ad. 1, at 1995.
121
Id. (quoting from AMBROSE, DE OFFICIIS MINISTRORUM 1.27). The idea of
resistance here places an emphasis on removing harm, not on harming, just as
Aquinas states: “Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be
inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with
the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 108,
art. 2, at 1657.
122
This interpretation of the phrase “do not resist the evil one” is in accord with
John L. McKenzie, The Gospel According to Matthew, in 2 THE JEROME BIBLICAL
COMMENTARY 62, 72 (1968), who remarks on its highly controversial nature:
The customary principle of self-defense is rejected by this saying of Jesus;
and the customary principle is not replaced by another principle of selfdefense. The saying is probably the most paradoxical of all the sayings of
the passage and has certainly been the object of more rationalization than
any other.
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B. Permission
There are four situations where Aquinas permits, or
arguably permits, an act that involves the death of a person:
(1) If a killing is not foreseen123 and is not a natural and frequent
consequence of an act124 and is not a consequence of an unlawful
or negligent act,125 the act that results in the killing is not an act
of killing because the killing is not voluntary. (2) If one sacrifices
oneself in an act of charitable love, the act that results in killing
is not an act of killing because the self-sacrifice does not take
one’s life but rather offers it to God in charitable love.126 (3) If the
only way to save oneself or another is by retaining or removing a
vital life support from a person who one knows will be killed as a
result but the vital life support belongs to the person saved
(whether oneself or another), the act that results in killing is not
an act of killing because one may prefer oneself in the use of one’s
own vital life support.127 (4) If the only way to save oneself or
those under one’s charge is by ducking, blocking, or redirecting a
deadly force even though one knows that someone will be killed
as a result, the act that results in killing is not an act of killing
because one may prefer oneself and those under one’s charge in
avoiding the deadly force.128 Each of these situations is explained
more fully below.

123
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472
(regarding unforeseen chance happenings).
124
See id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684 (“[I]f the consequences are not foreseen
[but] follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, . . . the
consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action.”).
125
See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 (asserting that unforeseen consequences
of a killing resulting from an unlawful or negligent act makes the person guilty of
murder).
126
Aquinas states that, despite the unlawfulness of killing oneself, “[i]t is clear
that the sign of the greatest love is to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.” AQUINAS,
supra note 6, at 290 (C. 15, L. 2), in commenting on John 15:13: “Greater love than
this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”
127
Aquinas states that, despite the unlawfulness of killing the innocent,
if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely
sufficient to support himself and his children, or others under his charge,
he would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give
away in alms, what was then necessary to him.
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329.
128
This permission derives from an analogy to the permission to retain one’s
own life support. Cf. id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329.
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(1) If a killing is not foreseen129 and is not a natural and
frequent consequence of an act130 and is not a consequence of an
unlawful or negligent act,131 the act that results in the killing is
not an act of killing because the killing is not voluntary.132 In
other words, there are two situations. The killing is willed, and
therefore intended, if the agent either knows that the killing will
occur or should know that it is a natural and frequent
consequence of his act or knows that he is committing an
unlawful or negligent act. In such a case the agent is morally at
fault. The killing is not willed, and therefore accidental, if it is
outside this knowledge of the agent. In such a case the agent is
not morally at fault.
It bears emphasis that the term accidental in this context is
not what is outside one’s purpose but rather outside one’s
knowledge. It is true that in another context, Aquinas states
that “everything that results in addition to what the cause aims
to bring about is an accidental, not an intrinsic, effect.”133 In this
sense of what one causes, an evil effect is always an accidental
effect because one never has an aim or purpose to do anything
but good.134 However, in the sense of what one intends, a known
evil effect is not accidental whether one knows it will happen as
an end or as a means or as a circumstance. Intention includes
129

See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 (regarding unforeseen chance
happenings).
130
See id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684 (“[I]f the consequences are not foreseen
[but] follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, . . . the
consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action.”).
131
See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472 (asserting that unforeseen consequences
of a killing resulting from an unlawful or negligent act makes the person guilty of
murder).
132
Id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684; pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472; see also id. pt.
II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471 (“[M]oral acts take their species according to what is
intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is
accidental . . . .”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 43, art. 3, at 1368 (“[S]candal is accidental when it
is beside the agent’s intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate
deed or word, to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy his own
will.”); id. pt. I-II, Q. 72, art. 1, at 902 (asserting that the voluntary act “is referred
essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such
matter”).
133
AQUINAS, ON EVIL, supra note 58, at 70. Aquinas states that
evil as such cannot be intended, nor in any way willed or desired, since
being desirable has the nature of good, to which evil as such is contrary . . .
. [Wherefore] no person does any evil except intending something that
seems good to the person . . . . [And thus] it seems good to the adulterer
that he enjoy sense pleasure, and he commits adultery for that reason,
even though one knows that adultery is wrong. Id.
134
Id. at 70–71.
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not only what one aims to do but also what one knows will
happen as the means by which or the circumstances in which
that end is accomplished.
As for means, Aquinas states that “the movement of the will
to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same
thing.”135 Thus, Aquinas can say that “it is not lawful for a man
to intend killing [referring to means] a man in self-defense
[referring to purpose].”136 It is possible that the killing may not
be intended directly but rather indirectly inasmuch as intending
an act which is unlawful or negligent incorporates the killing
within the intention of the act even without one knowing that the
killing will happen. Such cases include what today in human law
we would call felony murder (unlawful act) and drunk driving
homicide (negligent act). In such cases, the killing is unlawful
because what is intended (i.e., the felony and the driving while
drunk) is unlawful, and the killing is subsumed within the
intention of these unlawful acts.137
As for consequences, Aquinas states that “if [the
consequences of an action] are foreseen, it is evident that they
increase the goodness or malice,” and “if the consequences are
not foreseen . . . [but] they follow from the nature of the action
and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences
increase the goodness or malice of that action.”138 In the latter
case, an agent may not foresee these consequences of his action
but they follow from its nature and should be known. In this
respect, their evil is attributed to the agent’s intention.
Elizabeth Anscombe correctly comments that if Aquinas does
have a doctrine on responsibility for evil consequences of actions,
it is to this passage and not to his discussion of self-defense that
one should look.139
(2) If one sacrifices oneself in an act of charitable love, the
act that results in killing is not an act of killing because the selfsacrifice does not take one’s life but rather offers it to God in
charitable love. Self-sacrifice is not only permitted but is
praiseworthy because it is the perfection of charity. Aquinas
135

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. I-II, Q. 12, art. 4, at 641–42.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
137
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 8, at 1472.
138
Id. pt. I-II, Q. 20, art. 5, at 684.
139
Anscombe, supra note 73, at 24–25; see also AQUINAS, ON EVIL, supra note
58, at 74 (“[I]f evil is always or in most cases associated with the good intrinsically
intended, the will is not excused from sin, although the will does not intrinsically
intend the evil.”).
136
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quotes John 15:13 that “Greater love than this no man hath, that
a man lay down his life for his friends.”140 Killing derogates from
the gift of life that God gives to each person by taking life when it
is only God’s to take, but God gives us the example of His Son’s
love through His passion and death to teach us how to give our
lives to God in a way that is the direct opposite of killing. One
cannot take one’s own life by one’s own hand, but one can submit
to death caused by another person or force in order to promote
the common good. Aquinas states that right reason in accord
with charity “judges the common good to be better than the good
of the individual.”141 Charity “seeketh not her own (1 Cor. xiii. 5):
wherefore the Apostle says of himself (ibid. x. 33): Not seeking
that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be
saved.”142 Aquinas states that the perfection of the love of
neighbor “is shown by the things which man despises for his
neighbor’s sake, through his despising not only external goods for
the sake of his neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even
death.”143 The perfection of the love of God is martyrdom, which
“is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as
being the sign of the greatest charity.”144 On the other hand,
suicide “is contrary to the inclination of nature and to charity
whereby every man should love himself,” and therefore it is
always a mortal sin.145 An example of suicide is when a soldier

140
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 184, art. 2, ad. 3, at 1952. See
also id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1322 (“The common good of many is more
Godlike than the good of an individual” and therefore “it is a virtuous action for a
man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal
common good of his country.”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1298. (“[I]f a man of
his own accord offer himself for [his neighbor’s welfare in a case of urgency], this
belongs to the perfection of charity.”). Aquinas explains the meaning of laying down
one’s life for one’s friends in his commentary on John:
It is clear that the sign of the greatest love is to lay down one’s life for one’s
friends. This is so because there are four lovable things to be put in order:
God, our soul, our neighbor, and our body. We should love God more than
ourselves and our neighbor, so that for the sake of God we ought to give
ourselves, body and soul, and our neighbor. We should lay down our body,
but not give it, for the sake of our soul. For our neighbor, we should expose
our body and our physical life for his salvation.
AQUINAS, supra note 6, at 290 (C. 15, L. 2).
141
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 47, art. 10, at 1395.
142
Id.
143
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 184, art. 2, ad. 3, at 1952.
144
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 124, art. 3, at 1717.
145
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, at 1469. Suicide is a selfish act, oftentimes
committed in order to avoid what one mistakenly considers a greater evil, such as an
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kills himself by his own hand even if it is to save the lives of his
comrades, such as in a suicide bombing. A good example of selfsacrifice is when a soldier jumps on a grenade to save the lives of
his comrades—an act that belongs to the perfection of charity.146
(3) If the only way to save oneself or another is by retaining
or removing a vital life support from a person who one knows will
be killed as a result, but the vital life support belongs to the
person saved (whether oneself or another), the act that results in
killing is not an act of killing because one may prefer oneself in
the use of one’s own vital life support. A vital life support
consists of such things as food and water to sustain the body
against hunger and thirst, air to sustain the body against
suffocation, material support to sustain the body against a fall or
drowning, and even one’s own body itself.
The key to
understanding this permission lies in the passage in which
Aquinas states that
it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is
necessary. . . . [so that] if a man found himself in the presence of
a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient to support himself
and his children, or others under his charge, he would be
throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give away
in alms, what was then necessary to him.147

This passage must be read in the context of the duty to give alms
to understand its full meaning.
There is a duty to give alms. It exists
on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident
and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise—
on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which
he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with
probability.148

Aquinas states that “[t]he temporal goods which God grants us,
are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they
belong not to us alone but also to such others as we are able to
succor out of what we have over and above our needs.”149 Thus, if
unhappy life, the shame of sin, or the fear of consenting to sin. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64,
art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469.
146
See LONG, TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 73–80 for a discussion
of the difference between these two cases, although Long ascribes the difference to a
difference in teleological order.
147
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329.
148
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1328.
149
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328. Aquinas maintains that “it is lawful for
man to possess property” although “as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to
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one owns a vital life support that one does not need but another
does need, the owner should help out the other by giving the
support. In fact, if the other’s need is a matter of life or death,
the other is even permitted to take the support without it being
considered a theft and the owner has no right to a return.150
Aquinas is quite adamant about this duty. He warns that “in
such cases the words of Ambrose apply, Feed him that dies of
hunger: if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.”151
In the context of this duty to give alms, the passage that
states that “it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is
necessary” puts a priority on saving oneself over saving another
when only one can be saved. There is no duty to give one’s own
vital life support to another if it is needed for one’s survival, even
if the other will die as a result. Aquinas confirms this priority by
stating that “each one must first of all look after himself and
then after those over whom he has charge, and afterwards with
what remains relieve the needs of others.”152 There is one caveat;
Aquinas allows for self-sacrifice out of charitable love. He states
that the duty to look after oneself and those under one’s charge is
without prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing
that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a
great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it
would be a praiseworthy act to endanger one’s life and the lives
of those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a
person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s own.153

Other than this caveat, a person may save himself and his family
without the act being a killing. The act differs from a killing
since one retains one’s own vital life support as opposed to taking
the other’s vital life support away.
An extension of this case occurs when two people are in vital
need of food to survive, and one of them owns only enough food
for her own survival, and the other steals this food from her.
This is not a case of inaction where the owner of the food refrains

communicate [external things] to others in their need.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 2, at
1477. This communication is due from what people have “in superabundance” and
not from what they need for themselves. Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480.
150
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 7, at 1480–81.
151
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328.
152
Id.
153
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329. This passage should be read for what it
says. The praiseworthy act is endangering oneself and those under one’s charge in
this situation; it is not laying down the lives of those under one’s charge, although it
may rise to the level of laying down one’s own life.
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from giving the food to the other person, as in the last case. In
this case, the owner of the food acts to take her food back.
Aquinas indicates that the owner of the food may take her food
back in this case, even though the other’s death is foreseen as a
result of the act. Aquinas states that the other person “ought to
pay what he owes, . . . unless perchance the case be so urgent
that it would be lawful for him to take another’s property in
order to relieve the one who is in need,” but then he adds that
“this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress.”154
The creditor, who is the owner of the food, is in equal distress in
this case, and therefore the taking back of the food is not a killing
of the other person. This is an act of commutative justice
whereby the return of the food is due in justice in order to correct
the imbalance of the thief retaining what is the property of the
other.155 In one sense this case ultimately becomes one of
inaction after the imbalance is corrected because the death of the
other person results from the owner of the food keeping her food.
So far, the discussion of vital life support has focused on
support that is owned by one person as against another. In a
situation where the vital life support is not owned by either
person, Aquinas indicates that it may be allocated to one person
as against the other if a fair method is used to determine who
gets it. Aquinas quotes Augustine to say:
If thou aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him
who hath not, and which cannot be given to two; should two
come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need
or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than
in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou
canst not give to both.156
154

Id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1322.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 62, art. 1, at 1455–56.
156
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1608 (quoting AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA
CHRISTIANA I, xxviii (397)). A modern example of this case is that of two patients,
each of whom needs a respirator to survive toxic fumes, but only one respirator is
available. Neither patient owns the respirator; it is owned by the hospital.
Furthermore, it is impossible to save both patients with the one respirator.
Assuming that the hospital uses a fair procedure to allocate the respirator to one of
the patients, the allocation is permissible without the act being a killing. Aquinas
states that “no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission,
if he does not do what he cannot.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1525. Likewise,
if a father is holding onto his two children who have slipped off a balcony of a highrise apartment building but only has the strength to hold onto one of them before
help arrives, he may let one of the children slip to maintain his grasp on the other as
long as his choice is fair. See John Makdisi, Justification in the Killing of an
Innocent Person, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 85–86 (1990).
155
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Likewise, if two people own the vital life support in common and
both need it for survival, they could not act more justly than in
choosing by lot who shall have the vital life support that can only
support one of them. Making a fair choice by an agreement that
will transfer one’s commonly owned share to the other is a
prudent method for making the best of a bad situation. However,
if the two people who need the vital life support for survival are
not able to agree on how to make this choice, one cannot make
the determination on one’s own because it would be attacking a
vital life support not yet transferred and therefore still owned by
the other.
In some situations, although the vital life support is owned
by one person as against another, Aquinas indicates that the
owner may be under an obligation to give this support to the
other, in which case the support is no longer one’s own to retain.
Aquinas states that in cases of urgency “charity does not
necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his
neighbor’s welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation
to do so; and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that
purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.”157 Thus, selfsacrifice is permitted as a charitable act, but it is not required
unless one is under an obligation to do so, in which case one must
lay down one’s own life for another. One example of such an
obligation is that of a pastor for his flock. Aquinas states that
when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his
personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some
temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending
danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay
down his life for his sheep.158

Further on in this passage, Aquinas refers to a helmsman
immediately after quoting Augustine to say that “[w]hen,
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need
of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need.”159 It
is not clear here that Aquinas is saying that a helmsman owes
the duty to lay down his life for the people on his vessel, but the
suggestion is there.

157
158
159

428)).

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1298.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, at 1966.
Id. (quoting AUGUSTINE, LETTER 228 TO HONORATUS (Ep. ccxxviii) (circa
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Does a mother owe a similar duty of care to the baby in her
womb which requires her to lay down her life for her baby?160
There is again no clear answer in Aquinas’s work. A parent does
have a duty to care for one’s children.161 The duty arises from the
natural relationship whereby the child “is not distinct from its
parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s
womb,”162 and the “parents love their children as being part of
themselves.”163 This duty can be analogized to the duty of a
pastor for his flock, although it is not certain how much the
pastor’s duty stems from his embrace of the state of perfection.164
It would appear that the duty of a mother should be no less than
the duty of a helmsman,165 although it is not certain that Aquinas
would extend the duty of a helmsman beyond mere selfendangerment to the ultimate sacrifice of his life for the lives of
his passengers when this extreme situation is a certainty. On
the other hand, Aquinas does seem to indicate that the mother’s
duty of care does not require that she sacrifice her life for the life
of her child when he states that “each one must first of all look
after himself and then after those over whom he has charge.”166
He immediately follows this statement with an analogy to nature
by stating that “nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it
requires for the upkeep of one’s own body, and afterwards yields

160
Judith Jarvis Thomson raises this question when she states that
“[o]pponents of abortion . . . have tended to overlook the possible support they might
gain from making out that the fetus is dependent on the mother, in order to establish
that she has a special kind of responsibility for it.” Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense
of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 58 (1971).
161
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 9, ad. 1, at 1301 (the
duty “of parents to their children is especially one of care”); id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 8,
ad. 2, at 1966 (a man is “bound to support in bodily sustenance” the sons of his
body).
162
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. 12, at 1223.
163
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 9, at 1301.
164
See id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1966 (“When a man is appointed to a
bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection.”).
165
Aquinas states that “we ought out of charity to love those who are more
closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and
because there are more reasons for loving them.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 8, at 1300.
166
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328. Rhonheimer refers to Aquinas’s words in
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471, that “one is bound to take more
care of one’s own life than of another’s,” and affirms that “the natural and morally
legitimate drive for self-preservation [and] the similarly natural and morally
indisputable love for self [is such] that no maternal obligation and indeed no duty at
all can ever render [these] simply morally insignificant.” MARTIN RHONHEIMER,
VITAL CONFLICTS IN MEDICAL ETHICS: A VIRTUE APPROACH TO CRANIOTOMY AND
TUBAL PREGNANCIES 117 (William F. Murphy, Jr., ed., 2009).
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the residue for the formation of another by the power of
generation.”167 Therefore, it is an open question whether Aquinas
sees a duty by the mother to give the vital life support of her
body to her baby when her body can support only one of them. If
he sees a duty, then the mother cannot remove the baby from her
body if the baby’s death is foreseen. If he sees no duty, then the
mother can remove the baby from her body when the foreseen
death of the baby results from the lack of support from the
mother’s body, but not when the foreseen death of the baby
results from an attack on a vital life support belonging to the
baby.168
On the other hand, the duty of the pastor for his flock, the
possible duty of the helmsman for his passengers, and the
possible duty of the mother for her baby exists only as long as the
fulfillment of that duty is possible. Aquinas states that “no man
is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, if
he does not do what he cannot.”169 By way of example, he states
that “a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he have a suitable
opportunity, and if this be lacking, there is no omission.”170
Similarly, if a person who is obligated to save another person
does not have an opportunity to do so, then it would appear that
the person is not bound to the impossible. In the case of a pastor,
Aquinas addressed the question whether a pastor is a hireling
and not a shepherd “if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant,
a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted
to his care.”171 Aquinas answers that “he who, in order to avoid
danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not
flee as a hireling.”172 If the flock is going to be killed with or
without his help and there is no other benefit for the flock’s
salvation that can be accomplished by his staying (such as moral
167

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1327.
I am aware that the Catholic Church through The Holy Office has disallowed
such a removal. See HENRY DENZINGER, THE SOURCES OF CATHOLIC DOGMA No.
1890a (Roy J. Deferrari trans., 30th ed., 2002), providing the reply in the negative of
the Holy Office, approved by Pope Leo XIII, to the Archbishop of Cambrésis, July 24,
25, 1895, to the question whether a doctor could remove a fetus to save a mother
from certain and imminent death due to the presence of the fetus in her womb. I do
not oppose the Church; I accept its teaching. However, the project here is to
determine what Aquinas would have said if he had been presented with such a case.
The text is not clear on this issue.
169
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1523.
170
Id.
171
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, obj. 1, at 1965.
172
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, ad. 1, at 1966.
168
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support against despair), the duty disappears. Likewise, in the
case of a helmsman and a mother, where the passengers and the
baby are certain to die with or without their help, the duty to
safeguard, if it exists, should disappear. The helmsman should
be able to remove himself from steering the vessel and the
mother should be able to remove herself from sustaining her
baby, although in no case can either of them attack the vital life
support belonging to the other in the process.
(4) If the only way to save oneself or those under one’s charge
is by ducking, blocking, or redirecting a deadly force even though
one knows that someone will be killed as a result, the act that
results in killing is not an act of killing because one may prefer
oneself and those under one’s charge in avoiding the deadly force.
This situation is derived by analogy from the passage173 that
permits the retention of one’s own life support even though it
results in the death of another. Both the retaining action and the
ducking/blocking/redirecting action uses one’s own resources to
survive against a destructive force. In the former, the resource is
the vital life support and the destructive force is hunger,
drowning, etc.; in the latter, the resource is the guarding of one’s
life and the destructive force is a moving object. With both the
action of retention and the action of ducking/blocking/redirecting,
another person will die who would not die without the action, but
the death of the other person is the result of the destructive force
and not one’s self-initiated action of attack. Thus, it appears
appropriate to analogize the case of the one who avoids the
deadly moving force to the case of the one who retains the vital
life support and to conclude that both individuals are permitted
to act despite their knowledge that another will be killed.
Assuming that the analogy is one that Aquinas would
condone, a potential objection may still arise from Aquinas’s
statement that, even if a private individual wants to do
something for the common good, if it “be harmful to some other,
it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person
to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts
for the welfare of the whole.”174 The action for the common good
that redirects a deadly moving force to people it would not
otherwise have harmed appears to be harmful to these other
173

Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328.
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1467. The person to whom it pertains to
decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole is the person
under public authority.
174
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people. However, by treating this redirection in the same way as
the retention of one’s own vital life support, Aquinas would not
attribute the deaths of these other people to the one who controls
the deadly force but rather to the deadly force itself, since he
attributes the death that results from retaining one’s food to
hunger and not to the act of the one retaining the food. Aquinas
refuses to attribute causation to one who acts rightfully in
managing an essential cause of harm. This is evident when he
states elsewhere that the death of an innocent person is not
imputable to a judge in a case where his duty is to pronounce a
sentence of death in accordance with the evidence (the evidence
of a guilty verdict) “for it is not he that puts the innocent man to
death, but they who stated him to be guilty.”175
In a case where a deadly moving force threatens others’ lives
and one can control the force to kill fewer people,176 the situation
is again analogous to one involving a vital life support. Just as a
vital life support such as a respirator can be allocated fairly to
one person even though another will die without it,177 one should
be able to direct a deadly moving force fairly away from one or
more persons even though others will die as a result. Aquinas
speaks directly to how this should be done when he quotes
Augustine to say:
If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as
to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and
which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken,
should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far
as I can see, they must be chosen by lot.178

The ministers of God have a duty to remain at their post in order
not to forsake the Church, but not all of them are needed to fulfill
this duty. They all face death by persecution unless they flee. In
order to determine who goes and who stays, the fair method is to
draw lots. Similarly, one should employ a fair method in
determining how to direct the deadly force so that fewer are
killed.179 All other things being equal, Aquinas would probably
175

See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, ad. 3, at 1470.
One may have control as the designated driver or as a bystander who
assumes control when the designated driver is incapacitated.
177
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1607 (quoting
AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA I xxviii (397)).
178
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1607 (quoting
AUGUSTINE, LETTER 228 TO HONORATUS (Ep. ccxxviii) (circa 428)).
179
What is fair depends on the case. Aquinas states that one must use prudent
judgment when one must decide who to succor from among one’s family and
176
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agree that one should direct the deadly moving force to kill as
few people as possible.180
In the case where one’s own life is threatened but one has an
obligation to safeguard another with his life, the case of
ducking/blocking/redirecting is yet again analogous to the case of
retaining a vital life support. In this case, an obligation to
safeguard another with one’s life transforms one’s own vital life
support into a life support belonging to the other. Thus, if one
has a duty to save another and is faced with death from a moving
deadly force, one does not have a right to duck, block, or redirect
that moving deadly force if sacrificing oneself will save the
person he has a duty to save. In the example of the pastor
above,181 Aquinas specifically states that
when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal
presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his
personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some
temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending
danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay
down his life for his sheep.182

However, as also noted above, this duty should exist only as long
as the fulfillment of the duty is possible because, as Aquinas
states, “no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man
sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.”183 When the
duty disappears, the person in the way of the deadly moving force
has a right to duck, block, or redirect it in order to survive, even
with the result of the other person’s death, but in no case may
the person who avoids the deadly moving force attack the vital
life support of the other person or remove that other person’s
ability to duck, block, or redirect the deadly force himself.

strangers because “we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as
pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with
us,” but “this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or
matter in hand.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, at 1322. Aquinas adds that “if of two, one
be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide,
by any general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since
there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires
the judgment of a prudent man.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 31, art. 3, ad. 1, at 1322.
180
When speaking of an injury that one causes to another, Aquinas states that
“[o]ther things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects
more persons.” Id. pt. II-II, Q. 65, art. 4, at 1475.
181
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, at 1966.
182
Id.
183
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1525.
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II. CASE APPLICATIONS
The first Part of this Article examined how and why Aquinas
prohibits a private individual’s attack on the vital life support of
some person who he knows will be killed as a result, even though
it is the only way to save himself or another from death, but
permits that individual (a) to retain or remove from the person
killed the vital life support if it belongs to himself or the other
person saved, and (b) to duck, block, or redirect a deadly force
away from himself or those under his charge even though
another person will die as a result of that act. This second Part
introduces a number of controversial modern-day cases and
applies Aquinas’s concept of killing to their solution as a way to
clarify and enhance understanding of his concept. It is important
to keep in mind that this Article addresses only the extreme case
where one cannot save one’s own life or the life of those under
one’s charge without another person dying who would otherwise
have lived.
Therefore, this approach avoids the issue of
proportionality, concerning which Aquinas states that “though
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered
unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end.”184 Also, this
Article assumes that the death of one or the other person is a
certainty.
Uncertainty can change a prohibition into a
permission, such as when Aquinas states that “it [is not]
necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate selfdefense in order to avoid killing the other man,” meaning that
one can defend oneself with moderate actions that have a chance
of killing the other man but cannot “intend[] to kill a man in selfdefense.”185
A.

Case of the Craniotomy
A craniotomy or cutting of the cranium
is an operation that, at least at some times in the past, was
thought to be medically indicated when a baby’s head was too
large to allow normal delivery: instruments could be used to
crush the baby’s head (perhaps after emptying its skull) so as to

184
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471. For example, one cannot let another die of
starvation if one’s own life is not at stake and one has surplus food. Id. pt. II-II, Q.
32, art. 5, at 1327–28.
185
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
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allow the child’s removal from the birth canal and the survival
of the mother who would otherwise perish in childbirth along
with her child.186

This is an act that attacks the vital life support of the baby’s body
and falls squarely within the definition of a prohibited killing for
Aquinas. However, John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph
Boyle argue that the permissibility of bringing about the lethal
damage to the baby, which is foreseen and voluntarily accepted,
depends on “whether the killing is brought about as an end
sought (obviously not) or as a chosen means.”187 Their position
adopts Boyle’s way of treating a killing in self-defense and
extends it to a case of non-aggression. Since the killing is not
sought as an end, “a doctor could do a craniotomy, even one
involving the emptying the baby’s skull, without intending to kill
the baby . . . .”188
Finnis, Grisez and Boyle attempt to provide a justification in
Aquinas’s work for defining an intended means as one that is
sought rather than one foreseen by citing to his discussions on
discord and drunkenness.189 However, Aquinas does not make a
distinction in these discussions between a foreseen effect that is
sought and one that is not; rather, Aquinas distinguishes
between what is foreseen and what is not. The sin of discord
consists in “knowingly and intentionally dissent[ing] from the
Divine good and [one’s] neighbor’s good, to which [one] ought to
consent.”190 Yet, “when several intend a good pertaining to God’s
honor, or our neighbor’s profit, while one deems a certain thing
good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case
accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our
neighbor.”191 The accidental and therefore unintended aspect of
the act, which removes sin from the act (barring error or undue
obstinacy), arises from the fact that it is not foreseen. Likewise,
the sin of drunkenness consists in “willingly and knowingly
186
John Finnis, Germain Grisez & Joseph Boyle, “Direct” and “Indirect”: A
Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory, 65 THOMIST 1, 21 (2001). These operations are
no longer necessary in most medical environments because a caesarean section can
be performed to save both mother and child.
187
Id. at 24 (emphasis in the original).
188
Id. at 27; accord WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE GIFT OF
HUMAN LIFE 191–94 (3d ed., 2013).
189
See Finnis, Grisez & Boyle, supra note 186, at 19 n.29 (citing SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt II-II, Q. 37, art. 1, at 1352 (discord) and pt. II-II, Q.
150, art. 2, at 1800 (drunkenness)).
190
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 37, art. 1, at 1352.
191
Id.
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depriv[ing] [one]self of the use of reason.”192 Yet, when one
“knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating,” the
drunkenness occurs “accidentally and beside the intention.”193
The accidental and therefore unintended aspect of the act, which
removes the sin from the act, arises from the fact that it is not
foreseen. Therefore, Aquinas indicates a contrary conclusion to
that of Finnis, Grisez and Boyle. A craniotomy, which is the
knowing—and therefore intended—killing of an innocent person
as a means to saving the life of the mother, is wrongful because
“it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.”194
Rhonheimer offers another perspective on the moral quality
of the act of craniotomy. He justifies the crushing of the child’s
skull on the basis that “the obstetric intervention with the
consequence of the direct death of the fetus cannot be described
as an act of killing that infringes on justice.”195 The reason is
that “[o]ne cannot ‘take away’ a life for which it is already clear
that it will never even be born.”196 In saying this, Rhonheimer
does not deny the sacredness of life after conception; his point is
that one is not taking away a life in this situation when it is on
the verge of dying.197 Rhonheimer recognizes that there is still a
very short time span in which the child would otherwise live, but
Thus, according to
he finds this morally insignificant.198

192

See id. pt. II-II, Q. 150, art. 2, at 1800.
See id.
194
See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. Aquinas does not speak directly to the
prohibition of killing a fetus to save the mother, but he does speak directly to the
prohibition of killing a mother to save the child. In an article where he affirms that
one cannot baptize a child while it is still in the womb, he considers whether, in the
case of a child who will die in the womb and cannot be baptized, “it would be better
for the mother to be opened, and the child to be taken out by force and baptized,
than that the child should be eternally damned through dying without Baptism.” See
id. pt. III, Q. 68, art. 11, obj. 3, at 2407. Aquinas answers that “it is wrong to kill a
mother that her child may be baptized.” See id. pt. III, Q. 68, art. 11, ad. 3, at 2407.
195
RHONHEIMER, supra note 166, at 123.
196
Id.
197
He claims that the “[k]illing as a morally reprehensible act—i.e., more
precisely as a violation of justice—is not even an issue,” and the act “can be
described and judged to be morally right as an act of saving a life . . . .” Id. at 13.
198
Rhonheimer states that “by the craniotomy the baby’s life will be somewhat
(but insignificantly) abbreviated.” Martin Rhonheimer, Vital Conflicts, Direct
Killing, and Justice: A Response to Rev. Benedict Guevin and Other Critics, 11 NAT’L
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 519, 532 (2011).
193

110

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 57:67

Rhonheimer, the killing of the child is beside the intention
inasmuch as the killing does not have the moral quality of
injustice.199
Rhonheimer’s perspective on the moral quality of the act of
craniotomy fails to appreciate that for Aquinas the act of
injustice in taking a life is not affected by the quality of that life
but rather by the fact that one exercises dominion over the life of
a human person—a dominion that lies only in God’s authority.
To usurp this authority is an act of injustice against God no
matter what the state of the life of the person killed. It is not the
fact that the fetus has only a short time to live, but the fact that
the fetus is a living person, that is relevant when the act of
crushing its skull removes that life. To illustrate that there is no
injustice, Rhonheimer states that, if the child could think and
send a message to its mother, he thinks that the fetus would ask
her to let the physician perform the craniotomy.200 However, this
act by the fetus to take its own life would itself be suicide, the
taking of one’s own life to produce a good. The physician may not
act on this request any more than on the request of a son who
asks the physician to remove his heart at the cost of his own life
so that his mother may receive it as a transplant to save hers.
This is not an act of self-sacrifice by the fetus whereby it dies in
the act of saving by a force other than his own hand, but even if it
were, the mother cannot make this decision for the fetus since
the act of self-sacrifice is a purely gratuitous act which can be
accomplished only by the consent of the giver. A fetus does not
have the ability to give such consent. Therefore, contrary to
Rhonheimer’s argument, the killing of the child is intended and
does have the quality of injustice so as to make it a prohibited
act.201
199
Rhonheimer makes a similar argument for the case where “the only exit from
a cave in which a group of spelunkers are trapped is a small passageway in which an
obese participant in the expedition has become stuck.” RHONHEIMER, supra note
166, at 43. The spelunkers are in danger of drowning as the water level rises unless
they leave the cave, and the only way to leave the cave is to dynamite the
passageway, killing the obese participant in the process. Rhonheimer says that in
this situation “it makes little sense to say that those who blew open the
passageway—along with the obese participant who was stuck in it—assumed the
role of judge over life and death . . . .” Therefore, it is a permitted act since it falls
outside the ethical framework of justice. Id.
200
Rhonheimer, supra note 198, at 528.
201
Likewise, pace Rhonheimer, the spelunkers who killed an obese participant
when they dynamited a wall to escape death did assume “the role of judge over life
and death,” and the killing is prohibited as a violation of justice.
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B. Case of the Cancerous Uterus
In contrast to the illicit act of craniotomy, a hysterectomy
that removes a cancerous uterus from a pregnant mother who
would otherwise die, appears to be a permitted act for Aquinas
even though the fetus within the uterus should die from lack of
sustenance. In this case, if the mother does not owe a duty to lay
down her life for her baby’s life, she does not kill the fetus any
more than when one retains one’s own food for survival instead of
giving it to another who needs it for survival.202 The mother
retains the vital life support of her own body by the removal of
the diseased uterus. The act is permissible even though a
necessary result of this act is the death of the fetus from the loss
of the vital life support of the mother’s body. The reason is that,
barring a duty to lay down her life for her baby, a mother’s vital
life support belongs to her and, when it can save only one of two
people, she has a right to prefer herself.203 Contrary to the case
of the craniotomy, the killing does not occur by attacking the
integrity of the body of the fetus; it occurs by withdrawing the
support of the mother’s body as her own vital life support from
the baby. In the absence of a duty to save, this act is permitted.
In the presence of a duty to save, the mother cannot withdraw
this support unless the baby is going to die anyway, in which
case the fulfillment of her duty is impossible, and the duty
disappears.204
202
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 5, at 1328, where
Aquinas states that “each one must first of all look after himself and then after those
over whom he has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of
others.”
203
Note that one cannot make the argument that the fetus is treated as a
member of the mother’s body in this regard. The uterus corrupts the mother’s body
threatening death, and, if the mother were not pregnant, it would be “lawful with
the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of
the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare.” See id.
pt. II-II, Q. 65, art. 1, at 1473. Furthermore, Aquinas states that a child “is not
distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother’s
womb.” See id. pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. 12, at 1223. However, a child is distinct as to its
personhood, since a person is the result of the union of body and soul whereby the
soul animates the body while it is in the womb of the mother. See id. pt. I, Q. 3, art.
1, at 16; pt. I, Q. 118, art. 2, ad. 2, at 575; id. pt. III, Q. 2, art. 5, ad. 1, at 2037–38.
Therefore, while the fetus can be compared to a member of the mother’s body insofar
as the mother has control over it, it cannot be destroyed in the way that the mother
can destroy a decaying member of her body.
204
On a side note, the Catholic Church has approved the removal of a cancerous
uterus even if a fetus dies as a result. ODILE M. LIEBARD, LOVE AND SEXUALITY 126
(1978) (quoting POPE PIUS XII, ADDRESS OF POPE PIUS XII TO THE ASSOCIATIONS OF
THE LARGE FAMILIES (Nov. 26, 1951)), states that if
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The removal of a cancerous uterus is not the same as
radiation therapy to treat cancer in the uterus. Radiation
therapy attacks the bodily integrity of the fetus. If it is foreseen
to cause the death of the fetus, then it is prohibited because it
would be an act of killing the fetus. Radiation therapy stands in
contrast to the hysterectomy, which does not attack the bodily
integrity of the fetus but rather removes the fetus from the
support of the mother’s body over which the mother has mastery
(in the absence of a duty to the fetus) and which the mother can
use to save herself.205

the safety of the future mother, independently of her state of pregnancy,
might call for an urgent surgical operation, or any other therapeutic
application, which would have as an accessory consequence, in no way
desired or intended, but inevitable, the death of the foetus, such an act
could not be called a direct attempt on the innocent life.
In such a case, the Pope says, “the operation can be lawful, as can other similar
medical interventions, provided that it be a matter of great importance, such as life,
and that it is not possible to postpone it till the birth of the child, or to have recourse
to any other efficacious remedy.” Id. at 126–27.
205
This difference is emphasized by John Di Camillo who considers the case of a
six-week pregnant woman diagnosed with a life-threatening condition of peripartum
cardiomyopathy complicated by pregnancy. The threat comes from the interaction of
a normal functioning placenta with the mother’s weakened heart. The threat is not
present without the placenta-derived hormones, and it subsides with the separation
of the placenta from the uterus, which stops the flow of hormones to the mother. Di
Camillo quotes with approval the following statement from A Colloquium Organized
by Ascension Health, Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal-Fetal Vital
Conflicts: A Statement of Consensus, 14 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 477, 488 (2014),
to which he is one of the signatories:
‘[M]edical induction of labor prior to fetal viability, when necessary to
eliminate a grave and present danger posed by a pathological and lifethreatening condition resulting from the interaction of a normally
functioning placenta with the diseased and weakened heart of the mother,
is consistent with Directive 47, with Church teaching, and with the
Catholic moral tradition’ . . . . even though there is moral certitude that the
child will die immediately upon delivery or shortly thereafter.
John A. Di Camillo, Commentary, Induction of Labor and Vital Conflicts, 40 ETHICS
& MEDICS 1 (2015). Di Camillo points out that the induction is not a direct
destruction of the life of the fetus, which would be a prohibited abortion. Id. at 2.
However, he does not argue, as does this Article, that the liceity of the mother’s act
derives from the mastery she has over her own body allowing her to remove the fetus
from its support when it is a matter of saving her own life. Rather, he adopts the
reasoning of the Consensus that
the principle of double effect, as it has been taught in the Catholic moral
tradition, provides the appropriate framework of moral reasoning to assess
the moral status of interventions in PPCM+P . . . . Thus, interventions for
PPCM+P in which the death of the child is not the chosen end or the means
for causing the good effect of saving the mother’s life, but is rather a
foreseen but unintended side effect of an action that of itself is immediately
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C. Case of the Ectopic Pregnancy
An ectopic pregnancy is one in which the embryo implants
itself outside the uterus, usually in the fallopian tube. The
embryo cannot survive this situation, and usually if there is no
treatment, the mother will die upon the rupture of the fallopian
tube.
There are various methods for treating an ectopic
pregnancy to save the life of the mother. In a salpingectomy, the
part of the tube containing the embryo is removed; in a
salpingotomy (or salpingostomy), the embryo is removed from the
tube; and in a drug treatment with methotrexate, a chemical
treatment of the trophoblast surrounding the embryo causes the
death and expulsion of the embryo.206
The moral permissibility of these treatments depends on
much the same reasoning from Aquinas’s texts as that given
above for the hysterectomy and the cancerous uterus. If the act
of killing does not occur by one’s attacking the integrity of the
embryo but rather by one’s removing one’s own body from the
support of the embryo in order to save oneself, the act should be
licit. Even if the mother has a duty to save the embryo, it is
impossible to do so and the duty disappears. One can prefer
oneself to others in the use of one’s resources and one’s body.
Therefore, the salpingectomy should be licit as long as the
directed at curing the mother, would be consistent with directive 47 and
therefore permissible.
Medical Intervention in Cases of Maternal-Fetal Vital Conflicts, supra, at 484-85.
The Phoenix Hospital case of a pregnant woman with severe pulmonary
hypertension who underwent a dilation and curettage procedure that ended her
pregnancy to save her life in November 2009 is similar to the case discussed above,
but it is not clear that the procedure in the Phoenix case avoided harming the child
directly and thereby killing the fetus. See M. Therese Lysaught, Moral Analysis of
Procedure at Phoenix Hospital, 40 ORIGINS 537, 547 (2011), for this ambiguity. The
National Catholic Bioethics Center properly rejects such a procedure insofar as it
involves “the destruction of the child by crushing or dismembering it.” National
Catholic Bioethics Center, Commentary on the Phoenix Hospital Situation, 40
ORIGINS 549, 550 (2011). Nicanor Pier Giorgio Austriaco states that in the Phoenix
Hospital case “the deliberate removal of the unborn child’s healthy placenta prior to
viability was an act that directly led to the death of the child in the same way as the
deliberate removal of any adult’s healthy heart without any cardiac replacement
directly leads to his death.” Nicanor, Pier Girogio Austriaco, Abortion in a Case of
Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: A Test Case for Two Rival Theories of Human
Action, 11 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 503, 508 (2011). Austriaco believes that the
placentectomy was “a direct attack upon the vital organs of the fetus that is ordered
toward his death.” Id. at 509.
206
RHONHEIMER, supra note 166, at 90–91. A salpingotomy is similar to a
salpingostomy with the distinction that the incision is sewn up in the former and not
in the latter. Id. at 90 n.7.
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procedure results in the death of the embryo from a lack of
sustenance from the mother’s body and not from an attack on the
embryo’s bodily integrity. The salpingotomy is problematic
because in the direct removal of the embryo it is possible that the
instruments of removal could attack the integrity of the body of
the embryo causing its death before it dies from lack of
sustenance.207 However, if the intent is to remove the embryo in
such a way that its bodily integrity is not impaired and there is a
good chance that this can be done, the operation should be licit.208
The treatment by methotrexate should be prohibited because it
“interferes with the nucleic acid synthesis (DNA and RNA) of
rapidly multiplying cells such as trophoblastic cells and also the
blastomeres, the cells of the embryo proper which are also
rapidly dividing by mitosis.”209 Not only do the blastomeres
belong to the embryo, but the trophoblastic cells appear to belong
to the embryo as well.210 Therefore, an interference with these
cells, which itself causes the death of the embryo, should be
illicit.211
207
See Samuel E. Hager, Against Salpingostomy as a Treatment for Ectopic
Pregnancy, 16 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 39, 43 (2016) (arguing that a
salpingostomy often involves an invasion of the bodily integrity of the embryo with
laparoscopic tools and, at best, is a cutting of the trophoblast). If the cutting of the
trophoblast is what causes the death of the embryo and not the stopping of life
support from the mother, then this cutting would be an invasion of the bodily
integrity of the embryo that would constitute a prohibited killing.
208
In 1980, an embryo was even successfully removed and implanted in the
uterus where it went to term and was delivered as a normal infant. Christopher
Kaczor, The Ethics of Ectopic Pregnancy: A Critical Reconsideration of
Salpingostomy and Methotrexate, 76 LINACRE Q. 265, 268 (2009) (quoting Landrum
B. Shettles, Tubal Embryo Successfully Transferred in Utero, 163 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1771, 2026 (1990)). Of course, if implantation in the uterus is
possible to save the life of the fetus, then one must do so to avoid killing the fetus.
For arguments in favor of “abortion as removal” as opposed to “abortion as killing” in
the case of a salpingostomy, see id. at 267–72; MAY, supra, note 188, at 196.
209
Marie Anderson et al., Ectopic Pregnancy and Catholic Morality: A Response
to Recent Arguments in Favor of Salpingostomy and Methotrexate, 11 NAT’L CATH.
BIOETHICS Q. 65, 69 (2011).
210
“The trophoblast is a layer covering the blastocyst that erodes the uterine
mucosa and through which the embryo receives nourishment from the mother. The
trophoblast differentiates into an outer layer called a syncytiotrophoblast and an
inner layer called the cytotrophoblast. The origin of the DNA within the cells of the
trophoblast is the embryo—not the mother.” Id. at 671 n.22. See Maria T. DeGoede,
An Argument Against the Use of Methotrexate in Ectopic Pregnancies, 14 NAT’L
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 625, 630–32 (2014), for an argument that the trophoblast
should be considered an organ of the embryo.
211
Helen Watt maintains that “however short the child’s life will be, to invade
the child’s body (including the placenta and amniotic sac) in a foreseeably, seriously,
and exclusively harmful way seems incompatible with respect for the bodily
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D. Case of the Violinist
The cases of hysterectomy and ectopic pregnancy illustrate
situations where the mother withdraws the use of her body from
the embryo in order to save herself. The case of the violinist
illustrates a similar situation where one withdraws the use of
one’s body in order to save oneself, but in this case, there is
clearly no duty to safeguard. The case was originally described
by Judith Jarvis Thomson in a scenario that did not include any
threat to one’s life. As she described it, a violinist with a fatal
kidney ailment is hooked up to your body for nine months as the
only way to cure him, and to unplug him before the nine months
has elapsed would be to kill him. Thomson asks whether it is
“morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation.”212 If one
adds to this fact situation that the hookup will cause your own
death, the case falls within the category of extreme cases
examined in this Article. In accord with Aquinas’s texts, you can
withdraw the violinist from the use of the vital life support of
your body, just as a mother (without a duty) can withdraw a
cancerous uterus containing a fetus from hers.
The only
difference is that the violinist is a trespasser as opposed to the
fetus; therefore, there clearly is no duty to lay down one’s life for
the violinist. This does not mean that you can kill the violinist
by an attack on his bodily integrity, but it is permissible to
deprive him of the support of your body, which is needed to save
your own, even if the lack of that support results in his foreseen
death.213

integrity of that child.” Helen Watt, Bodily Invasions: When Side Effects Are Morally
Conclusive, 11 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 49, 51 (2011). See Kaczor, supra note 208,
at 272–79 (discussing the debate among several ethicists over the moral implications
of the use of methotrexate in ectopic pregnancies).
212
Thomson, supra note 160, at 49.
213
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328
(justifying keeping one’s own support when it is a necessity). Thomson makes the
point that a woman should be able to abort her baby to save her own life because it
is her body. Thomson, supra note 160, at 52–54. However, she makes no distinction
between an abortion procedure that attacks and kills the baby itself and an abortion
procedure that merely removes the baby from the womb. This distinction makes all
the difference for Aquinas when he justifies keeping one’s own support.
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E. Case of the Overloaded Boat
In the case of Holmes v. United States,214 the court instructed
the jury that, in the case of a life or death situation, a seaman
who is charged with the safety of passengers in a boat has a duty
not to sacrifice his passengers by throwing them off an
overloaded boat even if it means that he loses his own life. The
jury subsequently found that the seaman on trial who threw a
passenger overboard to prevent the boat from sinking was guilty
of manslaughter.215 The issue for the court involved the duty of
an individual to control a deadly force under the human law of
the jurisdiction; however, the seaman’s obligation as determined
by the court may also be his obligation morally according to
Aquinas. Aquinas states that “charity does not necessarily
require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor’s welfare,
except in a case where he is under obligation to do so.”216 Some
evidence that the obligation to imperil himself is the same as
that determined by the court appears in Aquinas’s reference to a
helmsman when he quotes Augustine to say that “[w]hen,
however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need
of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need.”217 If
it is such an obligation, Aquinas would reach the same conclusion
morally as the court did legally—namely, that the seaman was
obliged to put the lives of his passengers above his own and to
sacrifice himself before he sacrificed their lives.
The court’s instructions in Holmes also discuss the situation
of people on a boat who are on equal terms with no duty to save
each other. The court states that some of these people can be
cast off the boat to save the rest from drowning, but it must be
done fairly, such as by drawing lots.218 Aquinas would agree with
this approach.219 Likewise, in this case, where the people who
214
Holmes v. United States, 26 F. Cas. 360, 366–67 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No.
15,383).
215
Id. at 368.
216
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 26, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1298.
217
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 185, art. 5, at 1966 (quoting AUGUSTINE, LETTER 228 TO
HONORATUS (Ep. ccxxviii) (circa 428)).
218
Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 367. The court supported its position by stating that
“all writers have prescribed the same rule” that “[w]hen the ship is in no danger of
sinking, but all sustenance is exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to
appease the hunger of others, the selection is by lot . . . as the fairest mode.” Id.
However, to kill a person to eat him in appeasement of one’s hunger is an attack on
the bodily integrity of the victim and thus a prohibited killing.
219
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 95, art. 8, at 1608 (quoting
AUGUSTINE, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA I, xxviii (397)).

2018]

AQUINAS RECONSIDERED

117

need the boat for survival have an equal claim on it, they could
not act more justly than in choosing by lot who shall have the
vital life support that can only support some of them.220 Once the
determination is made, those who win the choice should be able
to use the boat to the exclusion of the others even if it means
casting them overboard to their death by drowning. The act is
not an attack on the integrity of their persons221 by taking their
vital life support because the determination by lots transfers
their vital life support to the winners of the lottery.222
220
If all the passengers on the boat are equal in their claim to the support of the
boat, the only way a lottery will work is if a sufficient number are willing to
participate in it because one cannot be forced to give up one’s right to stay on the
boat. On the other hand, if the boat is owned by the captain and the passengers
enjoy only a license to be on the boat, the captain has a right to determine who will
stay and who will be thrown off—in much the same way as a hospital may determine
who will get a respirator. The decision must still be fair, but it does not depend on
the consent of the passengers. Such a case might be that of a submarine that is
owned by the captain and about to be bombed. There is a crew member still on deck
who needs time to make it back inside the submarine before it submerges, or he will
die by drowning. However, the time needed for the crew member to make it back is
the time during which the submarine would be bombed and destroyed. The captain
would have a right to withdraw the life support of the submarine he owns to save
himself and the rest of the crew. This example is discussed in LONG, TELEOLOGICAL
GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 93–95, where Steven Long argues for the legitimacy of
an immediate dive, although his reasoning is based on the teleological order of the
act to its end of saving rather than on the right of the owner to withdraw the vital
life support of the boat.
221
This case should be distinguished from that of a man and child in a small
horse-drawn vehicle whose driver is trying to elude ferocious beasts that he cannot
outdistance unless one of the passengers is fed to the beasts to slow them down.
Rollin M. Perkins, Impelled Perpetration Restated, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 406 (1981).
Perkins states that “the saving of two at the expense of one, all else being equal,
would be morally right,” except for the fact that the man could have sacrificed
himself, and therefore by his choice to kill the child “he has no excuse at common
law.” Id. Aquinas would accept the man’s self-sacrifice as a charitable act of love,
but, even if the man were not able to sacrifice himself because he was stuck in the
vehicle, Aquinas would not permit him to throw the child out. This is not a case of
retaining a vital life support but rather of using another person to stop the deadly
force. As such, it is an attack on the integrity of the person and constitutes a
prohibited killing. Similarly, if one’s survival on a boat required killing a person to
eat him, the act would be an attack on the integrity of the person and a prohibited
killing. A little over forty years after Holmes, an English court considered such a
case when a seaman killed and, together with his comrades, ate a young boy as they
all faced death from a lack of food and water on a boat at sea. The court judged the
act to be murder. See generally R v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 QBD 273 (DC)
(Eng.).
222
Of course, one may act with charitable love and sacrifice oneself to save
another from being cast overboard. This is the perfection of charity by despising
death for one’s neighbor’s sake. According to John 15:13, “ ‘Greater love than this no
man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.’ ” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra
note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 184, art. 2, ad. 3, at 1946.
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In contrast to the case of the overloaded boat, if one is
stranded at sea on one’s own boat,223 which can only support one
person, and another person is drowning beside the boat, the right
to support of the boat is already in the hands of the boat owner.
No lots need be drawn to determine the ownership. The owner
does not kill by letting the other die if the only way to save that
other person will result in the owner’s own death. It is wrong for
the person in the water to take the boat away from its owner,224
and, if he does take it away, the boat owner may take back the
boat as may the owner of the food in Aquinas’s example.225 The
act of return, which is due in commutative justice, returns the
situation rightly to what it was before, and the death of the
person in the water is not a killing because it results from the
retention of the owner’s vital life support.226

223

The boat owner may have obtained ownership by title or by prior possession.
In other words, even if a person merely found a boat in the water and took
possession of it, he would be considered the owner as against all others except the
true owner. Aquinas states that “if the thing found appears to be unappropriated,
and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft.”
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 66, art. 5, ad. 2, at 1473.
224
As early as the beginning of the fourth century, one of the early Church
Fathers remarks on the injustice of the drowning person taking a plank from one
who has already seized it. Lactantius advocates the just act even when it appears
foolish and states:
What, then, will the just man do, if he shall happen to have suffered
shipwreck, and some one weaker than himself shall have seized a
plank? . . . [I]f he choose rather to die than to inflict violence upon another,
in this case he is just, but foolish, in not sparing his own life while he
spares the life of another.
LACTANTIUS, supra note 97, at V, 17, in 7 ANTE-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 95, at
152. Likewise in that same century, Ambrose answers the question “whether a wise
man ought in case of a shipwreck to take away a plank from an ignorant sailor” by
saying that “[a]lthough it seems better for the common good that a wise man rather
than a fool should escape from shipwreck, yet I do not think that a Christian, a just
and a wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another.” AMBROSE, supra
note 89, at III, 4.27, in 10 NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS, supra note 89, at 71.
225
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328, for the
food case.
226
Of course, if the owner of the boat cannot get the trespasser off the boat
except by attacking his vital life support, such as killing him with a gun, he has a
problem. He is not permitted to attack the vital life support of another person, even
a trespasser, and must suffer the result of death, if need be, just as in the case of
self-defense against an aggressor.
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Case of the Avoider

If one ducks an oncoming deadly force, the act is permitted
even if the ducker knows that a person behind him will be killed
as a result. By analogy to Aquinas’s passage227 where one may
retain one’s own food for survival even if the retention results in
the death of another, one may avoid a deadly moving force by
ducking it. The death of the other person is the result of the
destructive force and not the removal of oneself from its path.
Alison McIntyre offers an interesting variation on this case.228
Arnold and Bill are on a trolley track in a tunnel with a runaway
trolley bearing down on them. They cannot jump aside because
the tunnel is too narrow, and they cannot outrun the trolley. If
the trolley hits one of them, it will stop, but there is no other way
to stop it. Bill can outrun Arnold. McIntyre explains that Bill’s
outrunning Arnold is a case of negative agency (allowing the
trolley to hit Arnold as opposed to causing the trolley to hit
Arnold) and it is “allowable because the cost of preventing it—
self-sacrifice—would be too high.”229 By analogy to Aquinas’s
case230 of the retention of one’s own food for survival, one might
rather explain that a person is not obliged to give up one’s own
right to protect oneself from a deadly force when that protection
is needed for one’s survival even though another will die from
that force because one has a right to prefer oneself.231
Likewise, if one deflects an oncoming deadly force, the act is
permitted even if the deflector knows that a person in the path of
the deflection will be killed as a result. As in the case of ducking,
one is not obliged to give up one’s own right to protect oneself
when that protection is needed for one’s survival; the death of the
other person is the result of the destructive force and not of the
removal of oneself from its path. For example, if a person falling
from a cliff towards your deck will kill you by his fall even though
he will be saved, it is permissible to deflect his fall by shifting the
position of your awning even though you know he will be killed

227

See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328.
McIntyre, supra note 40, at 252–54
229
Id. The names, Arnold and Bill, have been added. McIntyre gives this as one
of several examples where the doctrine of double effect does not solve the problem.
230
See SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328.
231
This case should be distinguished from one who ducks behind another to
avoid a heat-seeking missile, because such an act uses the other as a shield, thus
attacking the integrity of that person and constituting a prohibited killing.
228
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as a result.232 On the other hand, if you are holding a flagpole on
your deck and look up to see a person falling towards you who
will be impaled on the pole if you do not move it (saving you and
killing him) but will be saved if you do move it (killing you), it is
not permissible to continue holding the pole.233 In the flagpole
case the act of self-defense is not a deflection resulting in the
death of the other person by the force of the fall, but rather an
attack on the integrity of the falling person’s life by impaling him
on the pole.
G. Case of the Mountain Climber
In the case of ectopic pregnancy where both the mother and
the embryo face death, the mother is permitted to remove the
vital support of her body from the embryo to save herself. A
somewhat similar case is that of two mountain climbers using
the same rope to climb the side of a cliff. The lower climber loses
his footing and is now dangling in a way that he cannot pull
himself up nor be pulled up. The stay that is supporting both of
them is giving way and it is certain that both will fall to their
deaths if the weight of the lower climber is not removed from the
rope.234 Yet despite their similarity, Aquinas would treat them
differently.
In the ectopic pregnancy case, the mother is
permitted to remove the support of her own body as a vital life
support belonging to her; in the mountain climber case, both
climbers share ownership of the vital support of the rope.
Therefore, if the lower climber is unwilling to sacrifice himself at
this point even though he sees that the result will be the death of
both climbers when the stay gives way, the higher climber is not
permitted to cut the rope. If he does so, he attacks the integrity
of the life of the lower climber by attacking his vital life support.
Note that in this case it makes no sense for the two climbers to
bargain for the vital support as in the case of the overloaded boat

232
See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 287
(1991), for the example.
233
See Whitley Kaufman, Self-Defense, Innocent Aggressors, and the Duty of
Martyrdom, 91 PAC. PHIL. Q. 78, 80 (2010), for the example.
234
This classic case appears often in the literature. See, e.g., LONG,
TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 72-73; Perkins, supra note 221, at 406.
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because the lower climber would not benefit from such a bargain.
The only way that the higher climber will be saved is if the lower
climber is willing to sacrifice himself.235
H. Case of the Conjoined Twins
In some situations, it is difficult to determine who has a
right to that which gives needed life support. Consider the case
where twins, Amy and Barbara, are born conjoined at the
abdomen.236 Amy, whose body does not have a heart, shares a
common artery with Barbara, which enables her blood to be
oxygenated through the heart in Barbara’s body. Neither will
survive if the two are not separated, but if they are separated
Amy will die. If the heart in Barbara’s body belongs to Barbara,
she may withdraw the support of her own heart from Amy
without killing her because, according to Aquinas, one can prefer
oneself to another in the use of one’s body.237 However, why
should the location of the heart within Barbara’s body make it
Barbara’s heart? The twins were formed from the same fertilized
egg and developed with the same heart providing life support for
both.238 If the heart belongs to both, then Barbara may not
unilaterally withdraw the support of the heart from Amy without
killing her because the heart is not hers to withdraw. If Amy is
235
The prohibition against cutting the rope would also exist if the lower climber
were unconscious, unless before he became unconscious he expressed his desire to be
cut off the rope either expressly or by consent to an implicit code of mountain
climbers that permits cutting the rope. See Kaufman, supra note 233, at 91.
236
This hypothetical case is based on Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical
Treatment) No.1, [2000] H.R.L.R. 721, 726 (U.K).
237
Steven Long makes a similar argument where he comments on the same
hypothetical case, using the actual children’s pseudonyms, Jodie and Mary, to say
that “since the heart and lungs belong to Jodie, and since they are needed by Jodie
to live, and no other being has a naturally just claim on their use, the confinement of
their use to Jodie and no one else need involve no positive choice to harm another.”
LONG, TELEOLOGICAL GRAMMAR, supra note 72, at 118. Grisez thinks the surgery to
separate the twins “could be morally acceptable in a case in which, without it, both
children probably would soon die, while with it one of them probably would survive
indefinitely.” GERMAIN GRISEZ, Difficult Moral Questions, in THE WAY OF THE LORD
JESUS 3, 292 (1997). However, his reasoning is based on the doctrine of double effect,
which teaches that there is no intentional killing of the weaker baby because “her
death was an effect of chosen means that in no way contributed to the end sought.”
Id. at 291.
238
One argument that might be made for Barbara’s ownership of the heart is
that the heart within her body is like a fixture. A fixture is owned by the owner of
the land to which it is affixed, and the heart could be considered analogously to be
affixed to and thus owned by the person whose body contains it. However, Aquinas
does not address this issue.
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old enough to understand, she may sacrifice herself in charitable
love to save her sister by giving up the vital life support of the
heart to her sister.239 Otherwise, there is no recourse to save
Barbara.
I.

Case of the Human Obstacle

If an aggressor uses another person to shield himself and the
only way to stop the aggressor is by knowingly killing the human
shield, the act is prohibited for the same reason that Aquinas
prohibits killing the aggressor himself. One may not attack the
vital life support of another person. Likewise, if a person is stuck
in the mouth of a cave, trapping others in the cave behind him as
rising water is about to drown them all, no one may use
dynamite to create an escape route if one knows that the
dynamite will kill the person who is stuck, even if this is the only
way to save the people who cannot otherwise escape.240 The
dynamite attacks the integrity of the person who is stuck. Even
the person stuck in the cave cannot blow himself up because it is
not an act of charitable love to attack one’s own integrity of life.
To blow oneself up is suicide, as in the case of a suicide bomber.
Suicide differs from the case of the conjoined twin who separates
herself from a heart belonging to her sister because in the
conjoined sister case the death that ensues is caused by the lack
of a vital support belonging to the sister, whereas in the suicide
case the death that ensues is caused by one’s own self-initiated
destruction of one’s own vital life support.
Similar to this case is the case where five patients are each
dying from organ failure and the only way to save their lives is to
kill a sixth person who can supply all their organs. This act is
prohibited even if the sixth person consents to being killed.
Similarly, if an aggressor holds several people hostage and
claims convincingly that he will kill all of them unless one of
them kills himself or one of the other hostages, a hostage is

239

If Amy is not old enough to understand, her guardian cannot make this
decision for her. A decision to sacrifice oneself can never be made by another person
because it is an act of love, which springs from the heart of the lover, not from a
surrogate. This is in contrast to the decision of a guardian to have a minor in her
charge participate in a lottery as in the case of the overloaded boat. In the case of the
lottery, one bargains for a chance to stay on the boat by offering a chance to be cast
off. This is essentially a bargain beneficial to the minor for an exchange of
ownership, and the guardian may act in the best interest of her charge.
240
See Foot, supra note 40, at 6 (presenting this problem).
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prohibited from killing himself or another hostage.241 It is the act
of killing by attacking the vital life support of oneself or another
that is evil and not the suffering of the act of being killed.
Aquinas states that a woman “commits no sin in being violated
by force, provided she does not consent, since without consent of
the mind there is no stain on the body, as the Blessed Lucy
declared,” and “it is evident that fornication and adultery are less
grievous sins than taking a man’s, especially one’s own, life.”242
Therefore, it is better to be killed than to kill; “[i]t belongs to
fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another,
for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin.”243
On the other hand, if the aggressor holds several people
hostage and claims convincingly that he will kill all of them but
will refrain if one of them surrenders himself to be killed by the
aggressor, one is not obliged to surrender but it is permitted to
sacrifice oneself out of charitable love in order to save the rest of
the hostages. To lay down one’s life for one’s friends is a
supererogatory act that is the perfection of charity. Saint
Maximilian Kolbe did just this when he suffered a martyr’s death
in the Nazi death camp of Auschwitz in 1941.244
J.

Case of the Trolley

Trolleyology has presented a conundrum ever since it was
first introduced by Philippa Foot in 1967.245 She considers the
case of a trolley whose brakes have failed.246 It is heading toward
five people who will not be able to get off the track in time. There
is a spur leading off to one side, but there is one person on it who
will be killed if the driver turns the trolley onto the spur. There
241

Philippa Foot reaches the same conclusion in a similar case where a judge
faces “rioters demanding that a culprit be found for a certain crime and threatening
otherwise” to kill others. Id. at 7. The judge is in a position to execute an innocent
person for the crime to prevent the others from being killed. Foot rejects this act,
saying that “most of us would be appalled at the idea that the innocent man could be
framed.” Id. Alison McIntyre remarks that this particular moral problem is not
solved by the doctrine of double effect, but rather “[t]he contrast between what you
foresee as a result of the agency of others and what you intend as a result of your
own agency is doing all of the explanatory work here.” McIntyre, supra note 40, at
232.
242
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 3, at 1469.
243
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 5, ad. 5, at 1470.
244
For a biography of Saint Maxamilian Kolbe’s life see ELAINE MURRAY STONE,
MAXIMILIAN KOLBE: SAINT OF AUSCHWITZ (1997).
245
See Foot, supra note 40, at 7.
246
Id. Foot also gives an example “in which a pilot whose aeroplane is about to
crash is deciding whether to steer from a more to a less inhabited area.” Id.
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is no other alternative. Foot concludes that the driver should
turn the trolley onto the spur and kill the one person instead of
allowing the five to be killed. Her justification is mainly
intuitive.247 The case can be justified further by an analogy to
Aquinas’s almsgiving case. In the same way that a man who has
“merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others
under his charge,” throws “away his life and that of others if he
were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to him,”248
the man throws away his life or the lives of others under his
charge if he does not duck, block, or redirect a moving force that
will kill himself or those others, even when that action results in
the death of another who would not otherwise have died. In this
case, the driver of the trolley249 has a duty of due care to drive the
trolley so that it does not harm others. To use Aquinas’s words,
these others are under his charge. The duty extends not only to
passengers on his trolley, but also to those outside the trolley,
such as the five people on the main track and the one person on
the spur who can be hurt by the trolley’s operation. In this case,
the driver cannot prevent the trolley from harming at least one
person. He must choose between the five and the one. Aquinas
247

Philippa Foot believes that one would “say, without hesitation, that the
driver should steer for the less occupied track.” Id. Thomson describes Foot’s answer
to this problem as one that characterizes the problem as “a conflict between a
negative duty to refrain from killing five and a negative duty to refrain from killing
one,” from which Foot concludes that “a negative duty to refrain from killing five is
surely more stringent than a negative duty to refrain from killing one.” Judith
Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 MONIST 204, 206–
07 (1976) (citing Foot, supra note 40). In her 1976 article, Thomson disagrees with
Foot that one must turn the trolley to kill only one and states that her intuition tells
her “only that it is permissible for him to do so.” Id. at 207. In an article nine years
later, while addressing the case of a bystander in control of the trolley, Thomson
adds that the permissibility stems from the fact that he “does not merely minimize
the number of deaths which get caused: He minimizes the number of deaths which
get caused by something that already threatens people, and that will cause deaths
whatever the bystander does.” Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94
YALE L.J. 1395, 1408 (1985). Thomson calls this “a ‘distributive exemption,’ which
permits arranging that something that will do harm anyway shall be better
distributed than it otherwise would be.” Id. Thomson points out that this exemption
is the redirection of a lethal force and not the use of other lethal means to
accomplish one’s purpose of saving the five. For example, one cannot throw a fat
man onto the tracks to stop the trolley from killing the five at the cost of the life of
the fat man. Id. at 1409. For further discussion of this problem, see DAVID
EDMONDS, WOULD YOU KILL THE FAT MAN? THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND WHAT
YOUR ANSWER TELLS US ABOUT RIGHT AND WRONG 35–43 (2014).
248
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1329.
249
The driver may be the designated driver or a bystander who assumes control
when the designated driver is incapacitated.
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would probably agree that, other things being equal, it is better
to redirect the trolley to kill one rather than letting it kill five.250
The killing of the one is not attributable to the driver because it
is impossible for the driver to save everyone, and Aquinas states
that “no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins
by omission, if he does not do what he cannot.”251
If the trolley has no driver and is proceeding down the main
track towards a person who is inescapably bound on the track
and this person can reach a trolley switch to redirect the trolley
to a spur where one or more other people are inescapably bound,
things are not equal here because one’s own life is at stake. The
principle of self-protection derived from the passage252 permitting
the retention of food as a necessary vital life support applies by
analogy to permit the person on the main track to redirect the
trolley to the spur to save himself from death, even though the
person or persons on the spur will be killed as a result.253 On the
other hand, if the person on the main track is not able to redirect
the trolley, but can block it by causing another person to fall in
front of the trolley with the foreseen result that the other person
will die, the blocking act is prohibited because it does not merely
block, but also attacks the integrity of the other person’s life.
If the trolley has no driver and is proceeding down the main
track towards a person who is inescapably bound to the track,
and if another person, who is inescapably bound to the track on a
spur, is able to reach a trolley switch to redirect the trolley to the
spur, it is permissible for the person on the spur to do nothing.
Yet it may be praiseworthy as an act of charitable love to redirect
the trolley to the spur in self-sacrifice, much as when a soldier
jumps on a grenade to save the lives of his comrades. However, if
the person on the spur is bound along with another person to
that track, it is prohibited to redirect the trolley to the spur as an
act of charitable love. Although a person may lay down his life
for his friends, Aquinas never indicates that he may lay down the
life of another. By redirecting the trolley, the person on the spur
attacks the integrity of the other person’s life. This would be

250

When speaking of an injury that one causes to another, Aquinas states that
“[o]ther things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects
more persons.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 65, art. 4, at 1475.
251
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 79, art. 3, ad. 2, at 1525.
252
Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328–29.
253
This does not prevent the person from sacrificing himself in an act of
charitable love.
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true even if there were ten people bound on the main track and
the person on the spur wants to further the common good by
having the trolley kill fewer people, namely himself and the other
person on the spur with him. Aquinas states that if a private
individual wants to do something for the common good but it “be
harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the
judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to
be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole,” that is, a
person with public authority.254 This situation is not analogous
to the case of the trolley driver who directs the trolley to the spur
with the fewer people on it. The driver in that case has a duty of
due care to all the people who could be harmed by the trolley and
the redirection is an act of protection of those under his charge.
The person bound to the track on the spur is not redirecting the
trolley to protect those under his charge because he is not
responsible for the people bound on the main track.255
254
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1468. Alon
Harel and Assaf Sharon reach the opposite conclusion. They believe that Aquinas
can be interpreted to allow a private individual to kill an innocent person if the
number to be saved is large enough. Alon Harel & Assaf Sharon, ‘Necessity Knows
No Law’: On Extreme Cases and Uncodifiable Necessities, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 845,
853 (2011). Aquinas states that “if a case arise wherein the observance of that law
would be injurious to the general welfare, it should not be observed . . . . [and if] the
peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved in referring the matter to
authority, the necessity itself carries with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no
law.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 96, art. 6, at 798. In other
words, according to Harel and Sharon, in cases of sudden emergency a private
individual on his own authority may avoid observance of the law when it is hurtful
to the general welfare, and, since the failure to rescue many lives at the cost of one
innocent life is hurtful to the general welfare, it is permissible to save the many
despite this cost. Harel & Sharon, supra, at 857–60. However, there is no indication
in Aquinas that the failure by a private individual to rescue many lives at the cost of
one innocent life is hurtful to the general welfare rather than promotes it. On the
contrary, Aquinas does state that when a private individual acts for the common
good, that individual may not harm another person. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra
note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 3, ad. 3, at 1468. Even an individual acting under public
authority may not harm an innocent person. See id. pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 6, at 1470. A
private individual acting on his own authority must not presume upon God’s
authority over life and death; this presumption, which is evil in itself, exists even in
a situation where the common good of saving lives is at stake. In support of the
prohibition based on intuition, Thomson reverses an earlier position of hers and
states that “A must let five die if saving them requires killing B.” Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Turning the Trolley, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 359, 367 (2008). But see
William J. FitzPatrick, Thomson’s Turnabout on the Trolley, 69 ANALYSIS 636, 636–
43 (2009) (opposing Thomson’s reasoning).
255
An interesting question to consider is whether Aquinas would accept the idea
that the person on the spur could act like a bystander who has taken over the
direction of the trolley in the absence of the driver by controlling the train switch. If
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CONCLUSION
This study of Aquinas’s texts on acts resulting in death has
been directed to understanding which are prohibited and which
are permitted in one extreme situation—when a person (whether
oneself or another) is certain to die if nothing is done and the
only way to save that person is by one’s act (as a private
individual and not one acting under public authority) knowing
that it must result in the certain killing of some other person.
Based on an analysis of Aquinas’s use of the term intention to
include foreseen deaths, it rejects the doctrine of double effect as
an interpretation of Aquinas’s discussion of self-defense,256 as
well as the conclusion from this doctrine that Aquinas permits
killing in self-defense that attacks another’s vital life support
when there is no other alternative to save oneself. Instead it
argues that Aquinas prohibits any act by a private individual to
save a person (whether oneself or another) knowing that it must
result in the certain killing of some other person, unless one
retains or removes from the person killed a vital life support
belonging to the person saved, or unless one ducks, blocks, or
redirects a deadly force away from the person saved (whether
oneself or another who is under one’s charge).
Few people have accepted such a strict interpretation of
Aquinas’s prohibition against killing. Yet the prohibition is
inherent in Aquinas’s understanding of humankind’s relation to
God. God retains authority over the life and death of a human
person because He made humankind in His own image enabling
humankind to become sons of God. Therefore, in every person,
including aggressors, we ought to love the God-like nature which
God has made. Those who understand this relationship between
humankind and God and have prohibited all killing by a private
individual include a number of the early Church Fathers,
Mahatma Ghandi, Dorothy Day, and Leo Tolstoy.
On the other hand, Aquinas permits certain acts that result
in the death of another person because he allows a person to
protect herself with her own resources. A review of the extant
literature shows no discussion that develops this idea on the
so, then an argument can be made for the person on the spur that he is protecting
the people threatened by the deadly force as people under his assumed charge and
that his directing the trolley towards himself and the other person on the spur is a
permitted act as choosing the lesser harm when the avoidance of all harm is
impossible.
256
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 1, pt. II-II, Q. 64, art. 7, at 1471.
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basis of the passage concerning self-support in a case of
urgency.257 Yet by this passage, Aquinas permits one to retain or
remove from another a vital life support belonging to oneself or
those one is saving if it is the only way to save, and by an analogy
to this text Aquinas permits one to duck, block, or redirect a
deadly force away from oneself or those under one’s charge if it is
the only way to save. There are times when one transfers one’s
vital life support to another by taking on a duty to protect that
other with one’s life, although Aquinas is not always clear as to
when that duty exists. In such a case one must be prepared to
lay down one’s life for the other. On the other hand, although no
duty exists to sacrifice oneself in charitable love to save another,
such an act is praiseworthy as reaching to the perfection of love
of God.
Aquinas’s prohibition against killing and his permission of
certain acts that result in the death of another are applicable to
several modern-day controversial cases, even though Aquinas did
not have occasion to consider them. For example, a craniotomy
and radiation therapy, which kill a fetus, are prohibited killings,
whereas a salpingectomy and a hysterectomy are not, although
there is some question in the latter case dependent on Aquinas’s
understanding of the duty of the mother. A conjoined twin or
anyone attached to a person’s body can be removed from that
person’s body to save the person’s life, although it may be
difficult to determine who is attached to whom in the former
case. People who share a vital life support such as a boat may
agree to a fair way to allocate ownership of the support of the
boat in a case where the boat will not support everyone, but in a
case where such agreement is not possible, such as two mountain
climbers on a rope, the only way to save one of them depends on
the other’s willingness to sacrifice himself before the stay gives
way. One may duck, block, or redirect an oncoming deadly force
to avoid it even if another will die as a result, but one may not
use another to block the deadly force nor initiate a force deadly to
another to escape it.
Hopefully, from this analysis, the reader may appreciate that
Saint Thomas Aquinas provides a deeper meaning to the value of
human life by considering it in relation to its Creator and Savior.
He challenges each of us to raise our thoughts to Him who
lovingly shows us the way to our ultimate fulfillment.
257

Id. pt. II-II, Q. 32, art. 6, at 1328–29.

